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2Abstract
This thesis analyses the way in which credit m arket imperfections affect the be­
haviour of economic agents, and examines how a variety of tangible or intangible 
assets such as fiat money, reputation and inventories, facilitate bilateral exchange 
and influence investment decisions of firms under such circumstances.
The first chapter of the thesis deals with the role of fiat money as a medium of ex­
change in a model in which agents hold consumable goods or nonconsumable cash. 
The physical environment of pairwise random matching for bilateral trade, however, 
prevents them  from issuing debt certificates. Unlike fiat money, consumables have 
uncertain quality characteristics, and agents can only detect the quality of a subset 
of goods. As a consequence, barter is plagued by asymm etric information, whereas 
monetary exchange involving generally recognisable legal tender is not. This sug­
gests th a t it is because of, rather than despite, its intrinsic uselessness th a t, as a 
medium of exchange, fiat money is superior to goods or assets subject to some form 
of quality uncertainty.
The second chapter examines the effects of reputation and internal finance on a firm’s 
investment incentives. An entrepreneur with unknown productivity finances risky 
production with a combination of internal finance and funds from external investors 
who, ju st like himself, are able to learn about his true productivity over time, a 
process tha t influences their willingness to lend. However, investment decisions taken 
by the entrepreneur, are not observable to outsiders. This information problem leads 
not only to underinvestment but also to prem ature liquidation. It is shown that 
the acquisition of reputation and internal funds may counteract such undesirable 
outcomes. On the other hand, it becomes clear tha t when assets are low, incentives 
to invest are disrupted because of a high probability of liquidation in the near future. 
Young firms appear to be particularly susceptible to  effects of this type.
Finally, the third chapter studies inventory investment and internal-finance decisions 
of a financially constrained firm facing an uncertain demand process. The model 
gives an explanation for the stylised fact tha t production is more volatile than sales. 
Assuming tha t firms have limited access to capital markets they are forced to rely 
on internal finance. However, following a series of unfavourable sales realisations 
such funds possibly are so low that firms find themselves unable to re-establish the 
old inventory level in subsequent periods. Conversely, after a series of high sales the 
firm has a substantive amount of money to finance output quantities tha t may be 
in excess of sales.
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The Walrasian theory of competitive equilibrium, developed in its modern form 
in the 1950s and 1960s by economists such as Arrow and Debreu, assumes that 
economic agents can enter m utually beneficial agreements of whatever complexity 
required, without this being reflected by an increase in transactions cost due to 
informational restrictions or co-ordination problems. As such costs seem particularly 
prevalent in credit arrangements, it is of little surprise tha t a large part of the 
literature dealing with deviations from the complete-market paradigm has focused 
particularly on credit market imperfections. A firm, for example, may find it difficult 
for a number of reasons to sell contingent claims on its future revenue streams. First 
of all, the firm may simply refuse to pay a promised amount of money to its creditors, 
and its owner-manager may deem it preferable to escape to some remote island with 
whatever cash there is. Alternatively, executives of the firm may use the funds given 
to them  for nonproductive purposes, thereby more or less intentionally moving the 
business into a position of insolvency in the future. Secondly, even if the firm ’s 
management is less maverick, it may be impossible to enum erate all the future states 
of nature the firm could possibly encounter, or it is too costly to write a contract 
tha t is sufficiently complex to warrant an efficient outcome. Rational investors 
foreseeing such difficulties naturally become reluctant to lend funds to firms. This is 
particularly true when firms are young and when economic relationships are allowed
10
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to be of a short duration only, as uncertainty is higher and exertion of control over 
the firm becomes more difficult.
Uncertainty and costliness of information, which lie at the heart of these problems, 
come in a number of guises. For one thing, they may simply be due to the unfore­
seeability of future events. Another, more profound form of information shortage, 
stems from an uneven distribution of knowledge over economic agents. That is, 
in many situations there may prevail informational asymmetries between potential 
trading partners which prevent beneficial exchange of goods.
Numerous mechanisms to m itigate such market shortcomings have evolved over time, 
and this thesis mainly focuses on three of them. One such mechanism, money and 
in particular fiat money, is a social institution: For it to have a positive effect on 
trade it needs to be widely accepted as a means of payment. Even in a system of 
decentralised exchange, as opposed to fully co-ordinated trading of the Walrasian 
type, the existence of money may then reduce the amount of information individuals 
need in order to carry out certain transactions with a minimum of frictions.
The other two mechanisms can be considered as private measures to relieve the 
burden of uncertainty. The first is reputation acquisition which induces a certain 
amount of trust into the productivity of a firm or the ability of a worker, making 
potential creditors less reluctant to lend money. Reputation building, however, is not 
free as it requires agents to forego present utility in favour of future attractiveness 
on the credit market. The second is the holding of inventories, in the form of 
physical goods or financial assets. Underlying the desire for this type of insurance 
is a precautionary motive. If agents cannot rely on the credit m arket to act as a 
buffer against various income or revenue shocks, they are forced to provide their own 
cushioning to counter unforeseen events. However, just like reputation acquisition, 
this mechanism is generally not costless either.
There are two broad themes that underly the research presented in all the chapters 
of this thesis. The first is the identification of consequences th a t credit-market im­
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perfections have for the behaviour of economic agents. The second is the a ttem pt to 
analyse how and to what extent the above-mentioned mechanisms help to overcome 
inefficiencies created by those imperfections.
Chapter 2 deals with the role of fiat money as a medium of exchange in a model of 
decentralised exchange. The fact tha t money is a social institution requires the use of 
a general-equilibrium framework. However, in a decentralised economy barter trade 
is restricted by a double-coincidence-of-wants requirements Clower (1967).1 A search 
model of the type put forward by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) is employed here, as 
it not only incorporates those requirements but also provides a structure of extreme 
decentralisation which makes borrowing and lending virtually infeasible. A random- 
matching framework may appear too extreme a modelling device for decentralised 
exchange, as in reality trades are often m ediated by middlemen. However, as Hahn
(1988) points out, their services cannot be provided without incurring resource costs 
and they will be more cheaply provided if middlemen, too, can exchange their goods 
for money.
In this search framework there is a continuum of agents who meet randomly in pairs 
each period to bargain bilaterally. The probability of meeting the same agent twice 
is zero, and therefore it is almost impossible to ever honour a debt contract when 
agents are spatially separated in this way. In other words, a rational agent does 
not trust the promise of a counterparty to make a future payment. It has been 
recognised by many authors, (e.g. Goodhart (1989)) that absence or lack of trust 
in a trading partner’s honesty is crucial for the existence of a means of immediate 
payment. Gale (1982) demonstrates tha t if there was no need for such trust all 
exchanges could be entirely based on credit.
However, for a good without intrinsic value, such as fiat money, to become a valued 
medium of exchange, agents need to have a sufficiently strong belief tha t it is accept­
able to a sufficiently large number of sellers in possession of a good of intrinsic value
^ o r e  detailed discussions of the relevant literatures have been om itted from this introduction 
and relegated to the outset of the relevant chapters.
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to them . It is clear that otherwise those agents themselves would refuse to accept 
the good in the first place. Consequently, fiat money may or may not have value in 
exchange. If it does, then it is due to some bootstrap argument, as reflected by the 
statem ent th a t fiat money has value because individuals expect it to be valued in 
the future.
Whilst a priori any commodity could be the object circulating in such a bootstrap 
equilibrium, it is obvious tha t some goods lend themselves more easily to play this 
role than  others. One crucial distinguishing feature is storability. All other things 
equal, a highly perishable good, or equivalently, an asset with a very low rate of 
return, tends to be inadequate for transactions purposes. For an object to be a 
good medium of exchange it should also store value reasonably well. Note, however, 
that the reverse statem ent does not hold, as a high store-of-value performance is no 
guarantee for a good to qualify as a good medium of exchange. It is the tension 
between storability and acceptability in exchange tha t, e.g, Kiyotaki and Wright 
(1989) focus on.
In contrast, C hapter 2 of this thesis concentrates on another characteristic of goods, 
namely recognisability. To this end, trade is restricted not only by the double- 
coincidence-of-wants requirement but also by individuals’ private information about 
the quality of intrinsically useful commodities, as opposed to fiat money which is 
assumed to be of uniform quality.
In the absence of fiat money agents are forced to use consumption and production 
goods for the purpose of indirect trade. There are three varieties of these physical 
goods each of which appears in either low or high quality. Only the la tter can be 
consumed to yield utility whereas the former do not yield any utility in consump­
tion but can, in principle, be used for trade purposes. There is specialisation in 
production and consumption in the sense tha t no agent can consume a commod­
ity of the same type as tha t produced by himself, a feature which reflects gains 
from specialisation in production. However, different agents specialise in different 
consumption-production pairs. The difficulty tha t arises in the ensuing barter ar­
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rangement is tha t a typical agent can only recognise the quality of product varieties 
produced or consumed by himself but not of the third commodity when it is offered 
to him in trade. Thus, there is also specialisation in quality recognition.
It is first dem onstrated tha t strategies which postulate to knowingly accept a good 
of low quality are weakly dominated. Eliminating them  ensures th a t a situation of 
one-sided private information occurs only when an agent carrying his production 
good meets someone who wants to consume this good but offers a commodity whose 
quality cannot be detected by th a t agent.
Under these circumstances the economy exhibits a unique stationary equilibrium, 
which is characterised by uninformed parties strictly randomising over whether to 
accept or to reject a good whose quality they are unable to recognise. The probability 
of acceptance is decreasing in the share of low-quality goods present in the economy 
and the rate of tim e preference. This outcome is contrasted with a situation where 
such informational asymmetries are assumed away. In this case there are multiple 
equilibria, in one of which each good is accepted with certainty, and a higher welfare 
level is therefore achieved.
By introducing fiat money into the economy with private information agents obtain 
an additional object for indirect trade. It is different from the physical commodities 
in tha t it is always intrinsically useless and of uniform quality. The central result 
of the chapter is th a t there exists an equilibrium in this m onetary economy such 
tha t money is accepted with probability one, and non-recognised goods are still 
accepted with a probability strictly within the unit interval. Hence, m onetary and 
barter trade co-exist. As a consequence, fiat money can be introduced in such a way 
tha t welfare is increased in comparison to the nonmonetary economy with quality 
uncertainty, although, at each point in time, the output of high-quality consumable 
products is diminished by doing so.
Thus, in a world with private information about quality characteristics of goods, a 
medium of exchange such as fiat money is superior to consumption or production
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goods for trade purposes because of, and not despite, its intrinsic uselessness. If 
one extends the notion of quality uncertainty to the creditworthiness of issuers of 
financial instrum ents other than fiat money, such as, e.g. private debt, differing 
degrees of ‘moneyness’ of various assets can also be partly explained.
Unlike the first contribution Chapters 3 and 4 assume partial-equilibrium  perspec­
tives, as they address intertem poral decision-making problems of a single firm. The 
access to the credit market is limited in one case, and still excluded altogether in the 
other. The th ird  chapter considers a dynamic-investment problem of a firm whose 
ability to raise external funds is reduced by investors’ inability to observe the invest­
ment decisions taken by its owner-manager, a fact which may induce the la tter to 
divert part of the external finance into private consumption rather than productive 
activities. In the light of this information shortage, other factors such as reputation 
and internal finance become crucial in determining the amount of funds raised.
Moral-hazard problems appear in many other areas. For instance, a firm buying 
labour services may not be able to observe directly the amount of labour supplied. 
As a consequence, wage payment will have to depend on a signal related to labour 
input. As such signals are usually also influenced by other factors, an inefficient 
risk allocation results under a contract tha t provides incentives to work. Holmstrom 
(1982) shows tha t tim e may have a favourable effect on a m anager’s incentives to 
exert effort, even when explicit long-term contracts are not feasible. If the manager 
is concerned about his reputation in the long run, he will be less tem pted to shirk 
despite the fact tha t this would be in his short-term  interest. The managerial labour 
market provides implicit incentives to work, which under certain circumstances may 
be particularly true for young managers.
In assessing the investment incentives of an entrepreneur who for some reason is 
not able to issue long-term debt contracts, one should therefore be able to draw 
similar conclusions about the provision of incentives by the credit market. Put 
differently, the fact tha t bad current outcomes may damage the entrepreneur’s ability 
to raise funds in the future, may prevent him from diverting too many resources into
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consumption. The question are, however, whether these implicit control mechanisms 
can entirely remove inefficiencies stemming from moral-hazard problems, and to 
what extent they still work in the presence of an outside option as introduced by 
Jovanovic (1982), a study of industry selection in which reputational concerns do 
not m atte r.2 If an entrepreneur no longer deems his business worthy of being kept 
alive he can always opt for liquidation and found a new firm or provide his services 
on the labour market.
As Chapter 3 will show, the presence of an outside options is of great significance. 
The true productivity of the entrepreneur who finances risky production with a 
combination of internal and external funds is known neither to the outside financiers 
nor to himself. All parties, however, are able to gradually find out more about that 
value over tim e through a process of Bayesian learning. This information directly 
determines external investors’ willingness to lend.
The investment decisions taken by the entrepreneur, on the other hand, are not 
observable to outside parties. In equilibrium this leads not only to underinvestment 
but also to prem ature liquidation which is executed by the entrepreneur as soon as 
the outside option appears more valuable to  him than the continuation of the firm’s 
production activities. W hilst it is true tha t reputational concerns and the acquisi­
tion of internal funds may counteract undesirable aspects such as underinvestment 
it becomes clear th a t in cases of low asset positions and reputational distress in­
vestment incentives are disrupted because of a high probability of liquidation in the 
near future.
Young firms appear to be particularly susceptible to effects of this type, since the 
volatility of growth rates is inversely related to age. This is a consequence of the 
gradually decreasing sensitivity of the reputation-updating rule to new information.
2Reputation acquisition in debt markets has also been the focus of other analyses such as, e.g., 
Diamond (1989) and Diamond (1991). In these papers, the borrower chooses the riskiness of a 
project rather than investment size, and moreover, there exists a problem of adverse selection. 
Despite these structural differences, however, the conclusions about the way in which reputational 
concerns affect incentives are remarkably close to those drawn in Chapter 3.
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As the firm grows older new data will have a diminishing im pact on learning as 
it becomes relatively insignificant compared to a long history of outcomes. This 
implies tha t the death rate of firms decreases over tim e, which is consistent with 
casual observation.
On the other hand, it is shown that the investment rate does not generally decrease 
over time, in spite of the fact tha t Bayesian updating becomes less and less sensitive 
to new information. The explanation for this lies in the presence of the outside 
option which renders the entrepreneur cautious when putting resources into the 
risky technology. It may be preferable to keep operations on a lower level in the 
beginning in order to gather more information about his own productivity.
A business in reputational distress has little incentives to run its operations on a 
high level for at least two reasons. The first is the direct effect th a t a low reputation 
has as a signal to outside investors. A firm in such a position will find it relatively 
difficult to a ttract external funds. The second and possibly more im portant reason 
is tha t when a firm is close to the liquidation point it runs a considerable risk of not 
reaping substantive benefits from additional production inputs, as the probability of 
losing them  through exit and liquidation cost is relatively high. A similar conclusion 
can be drawn for situations of financial distress, which is characterised by low levels 
of internal financial wealth.
The main conclusions of the analysis are concerned with the potential role of mon­
itoring. The shortcomings of capital m arkets described above provide a rationale 
for close supervision of young or troubled firms by financial intermediaries. The 
framework of symmetric uncertainty about a firm’s expected productivity is par­
ticularly appropriate for start-up entities, as the owners or managers of such new 
businesses often know little more about the probability of success of a new idea 
or technological development than outside parties. Therefore, the study may also 
contribute to an explanation why venture capitalists are usually heavily involved 
in new firms, not just financially but in almost any other business aspect. More 
generally, the possibility to obtain monitored funds may have a positive effect on
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young and distressed firms’ incentives to invest and thereby reduce the number of 
socially undesirable liquidations. Furthermore, credit rating agencies also play an 
im portant role in filling some informational gaps of the kind discussed here.
The fourth chapter studies the implications of financing constraints on optim al in­
tertem poral inventory-investment and internal-finance decisions of a firm facing an 
uncertain demand process.
The background for this exercise is the stylised fact from the empirical literature 
tha t the variance of production exceeds the variance of sales. Ample evidence for 
this has been found on firm-, industry- and macro-economic level (see, e.g., Blinder 
and Maccini (1991)). These findings have attracted considerable attention, as they 
contradict the predictions standard neoclassical, i.e. linear-quadratic, inventory- 
investment model. In the la tter approach businesses a ttem pt to smooth their out­
put levels over tim e due to convex cost functions. Optimal inventory management 
supports them  in the pursuit of that goal as stocks buffer unforeseen demand fluc­
tuations. Correspondingly, inventory investment, defined as the change in target 
inventories (amount of goods made available for sale), is negatively correlated with 
sales in those models. Again, the empirical evidence tends to point in the opposite 
direction, albeit somewhat less clearly than with respect to the relative variances of 
output and sales.
Previous attem pts to explain the excess variance of production can be put into three 
classes. In the first and most prominent approach a num ber of authors have modi­
fied the linear-quadratic model by introducing either nonconvex costs (e.g. Ramey 
(1991)) or cost shocks (e.g. Blinder (1986)). However, these models do not receive 
much empirical support.
The second approach is to use stockout-avoidance models w ith serially correlated 
demand processes or the possibility to backlog demand (e.g. Kahn (1987)). That 
serially correlated demand does exist and tha t demand backlogs are an im portant 
instrum ent for many firms and industries is not disputed here. However, demand
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itself, as opposed to realised sales, is mostly impossible to observe empirically, and 
when there are many competitors in an industry or close substitutes to a product, 
firms may find it very difficult to backlog demand.
Models in the second group have experienced very little empirical testing (see, e.g. 
Kahn (1992)), and the same is true for the third category (one exception being 
Mosser (1990)), the (s,S)-type inventory models. The la tte r are somewhat unsat­
isfactory for the purpose of explaining the two main puzzles at hand because they 
predict a zero, instead of a slightly positive, covariance between inventory investment 
and sales.
The model in chapter 4 is closest in spirit to the second approach because it also uses 
a stockout-avoidance framework. However, it distinguishes itself from tha t category 
because one of its main results is that even sales which do not contain information 
about expected future sales affect present production. Moreover, unlike (s,S) models 
it predicts a positive covariance between inventory investment and sales, m atching 
empirical observations more closely.
The chapter considers a firm which produces an imperfectly storable good at a con­
stant unit cost and attem pts to sell its output each period at a constant price, such as 
to maximise the present discounted value of consumption (dividends) over an infinite 
lifetime. The business faces a sequence of independently and identically distributed 
demand shocks. Each period the stock of unsold goods depreciates partially, and 
the firm makes decisions about gross production expenditures, cash retention as well 
as consumption expenditures. These decisions are once again crucially constrained 
by the requirement that they be nonnegative, and tha t their sum must not exceed 
cash holdings in th a t period.
In a simple example where the demand distribution, the depreciation technology as 
well as production cost and output price are param etrised, explicit optimal policies 
in a stationary equilibrium can be found. From this one can derive the station­
ary distribution of production and sales distribution and show that the variance of
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production exceeds the variance of sales.
To show tha t the validity of the production counter-smoothing result does not hinge 
on the specific param eter values used in the simple example a general model is 
also examined. The outcome is contrasted with th a t of a model where one crucial 
financing constraints is absent, namely the nonnegativity constraint on consumption, 
in which case the variances for production and sales are identical. It follows as a 
corollary of the production counter-smoothing result tha t inventory investment is 
positively correlated with sales and, more generally, with the level of own assets such 
as money and goods.
Equally im portant as the above result, the equilibrium in this model exhibits the 
additional property of positive autocorrelation in sales. It does so even though the 
underlying demand process is specified to be serially uncorrelated. This result is 
very useful as demand is generally not empirically observable.
Chapter 2
Fiat M oney and Quality 
U ncertainty
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the role of money as a medium of exchange when barter trade 
is restricted not only by the double-coincidence-of-wants requirement but also by 
private information about the quality of commodities. For this purpose the model 
of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) is extended to include commodities of both high and 
low quality.
While this contribution is mainly directed towards a better understanding of the 
microeconomic foundations of m onetary theory it also relates to im portant ques­
tions often raised in m onetary policy debates. It is often said tha t a medium of 
exchange issued by authorities has many close substitutes such as IOUs or even 
barter commodities. To justify the claim tha t the medium of exchange supply is not 
entirely beyond m onetary authorities’ control and therefore such policy measures as 
open-market operations or regulations concerning the supply of bank deposits are 
not futile, one needs to dem onstrate or even quantify imperfections in the substi­
tutability  between various media of exchange (Hellwig (1992)).
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This problem is addressed here by studying a framework with bilateral exchanges 
and asymmetric information. In contrast, most of the monetary economics litera­
ture does not model trade as a decentralised process which is the m ain reason why 
satisfactory answers to the above questions do not exist.
Despite the work of classical (Smith (1776)) and early neo-classical (Jevons (1875)) 
economists, who have recognised tha t the central role of a object like money is 
th a t of a medium of exchange, Walrasian models have clearly dom inated general 
equilibrium analysis for the last decades. These models are comparatively tractable 
and highly sophisticated. However, one of their drawbacks is tha t they use a com­
pletely centralised trading process (the Walrasian auctioneer). There is no role for a 
medium of exchange in general or fiat money in particular within such a framework, 
since every scarce commodity with a positive value in equilibrium can be exchanged 
for a positive amount of another commodity (see, e.g., Hahn (1965)).
That is true not only for the exchange process in the static Arrow-Debreu setting but 
also for its intertem poral versions, be it the sequential-equilibrium approach (e.g., 
Hahn (1973)) or the overlapping generations models (e.g., Wallace (1980)). Both 
of them  introduce a device tha t allows individuals to break their lifetime budget 
constraints tem porarily and thereby permits them  to improve on the intertem poral 
allocation of their resources. Many authors call this device ‘money’, but Tobin (1980) 
points to a semantic problem of using this label. The means of payment referred 
to as money in those models bears little resemblance to the real-world object they 
try  to study. The intertem poral reallocation device used in these contributions is 
merely a store of value, and numerous other assets (real or financial) or even social 
institutions could serve this purpose at least as well as (fiat) money. Therefore, even 
in these models there is no room for a medium of exchange.
Notable exceptions are papers by Gale (1978) or Grimes (1987) who consider money 
as a good th a t fills the gap left by an absence of complete trust in a trade relationship. 
Credit m arkets do not work perfectly as a seller may not always accept personal 
1 0 Us of a buyer, but usually he is willing to take cash as a means of paym ent such
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tha t trade occurs nevertheless. However, it still remains to be explained why an 
intrinsically valueless good is most appropriate to play this role.
There have been earlier attem pts in the literature to incorporate the transactions role 
of money into the analysis of monetary economics. I only remind the reader of the 
well-known inventory-theoretical, partial-equilibrium models by Baumol (1952) and 
Tobin (1956), and the cash-constraint models by Clower (1967) which still represent 
the dominant paradigm for macroeconomic models with money. These lines of work 
have in common tha t they take the medium-of-exchange role of money as exogenous 
and are still based on centralised markets.
More recent studies try to endogenise the transactions role of money by explic­
itly analysing decentralised exchange processes tha t take the double-coincidence- 
of-wants problem seriously. Townsend (1980) introduces models of money with 
spatially separated agents tha t can be interpreted as special versions of overlapping- 
generations models in which agents live for two periods such th a t they can trade 
with an agent of another generation in one period only. Agents in his turnpike mod­
els do not issue 10Us since the particular structure rules out the possibility that 
two agents meet more than once. As a consequence no credit is given and there is 
a need for a device like money without any uncertain personal backing in order to 
overcome the lack of double coincidence of wants.
A quite different structure of bilateral trade relationships is examined in a series of 
papers by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1990, 1991). These studies model trade as 
the outcome of an ongoing random matching process where the identity of future 
bilateral trading partners cannot be foreseen perfectly. The authors stress the im­
portance of expected future trade possibilities when double coincidence fails to hold 
and storage of goods is costly.
Banerjee and Maskin (1990) suggest a framework th a t resembles closely the Wal­
rasian setting. They avoid questions concerning the search for trading partners and 
the problem of co-ordination between several markets or trade relationships. Instead
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they merely concentrate on the double-coincidence-of-wants problem by introducing 
separate m arket clearing conditions for each barter m arket instead of just one goods 
m arket in the W alrasian sense. On a particular barter m arket only two goods can 
be exchanged whereas on a Walrasian commodity market a certain good can be 
traded against all other goods. However, proceeding in this way still leaves a very 
strong element of centralisation in the analysis, the only difference being tha t the 
auctioneer now has barter markets instead of commodity markets to clear.
Informational asymmetries are at the core of the present paper, too (see also Brun­
ner and Meltzer (1971) or Alchian (1977) for less formal treatm ents); it aims at 
explaining the selection of a good like fiat money as the medium of exchange in 
bilateral trade under quality uncertainty.1 Following Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) 
a model of sequential bilateral trading where agents meet randomly is considered. 
To explain how an intrinsically useless good like fiat money becomes a preferred 
medium of exchange is the goal of the analysis.
In contrast to Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) storage costs (rates of return) are identical 
for all goods in this paper. W hat is emphasised is the recognisability aspect of a 
medium of exchange. While a consumer or a producer of a good always detects its 
quality, agents who neither produce nor consume tha t good are not able to do so 
unless they own it. If the la tte r accept such a good, which with some probability is 
of low quality, they face the possibility of being m atched next period with someone 
who may not want to trade because he immediately notices the quality of this good; 
as a result, they will be reluctant to accept it in the first place. In contrast, fiat 
money is a good whose quality is assumed to be uniform and to be recognised by 
all agents. It may therefore facilitate trade.
1 After writing the first draft of my paper on which the present chapter is based I became aware of 
a contribution by Steve Williamson and Randall Wright (now published in the American Economic 
Review [1994]) who also study bilateral exchange under private information. They proceed in a 
somewhat different framework. In their paper there is only one type of consumption good, i.e. 
there is no double-coincidence-of-wants problem, but agents can choose whether to produce the 
low or the high quality variant whereas in the present study there are three different types of goods 
with the proportion of low quality goods fixed exogenously.
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The paper is organised as follows. 2.2 sets up the physical environment of the 
model and 2.3 presents some implications of the informational assumptions for the 
bargaining process. In the fourth section a benchmark economy devoid of quality 
uncertainty is analysed. Section 2.5 considers an economy with quality uncertainty 
in which there is no fiat money and in Section 2.6 the consequences of introducing fiat 
money are studied. Section 2.7 compares the welfare levels of the three economies 
and the final section provides some conclusive remarks.
2.2 The Physical Environment
2.2.1 The M odel
The basic structure of the model is an extension of the one in Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989). Consider an economy th a t evolves at an infinite sequence of periods. There 
are three varieties of indivisible goods i (i =  1,2 ,3), and each variety can appear in 
two different qualities, high (H)  and low (L). Let F (i =  1,2,3; j  = H ,L )  denote 
good i of quality j .
There is a continuum of infinitely-lived agents with unit mass which is equipropor- 
tionately divided into three types of agents k (k =  1,2 ,3). The types differ with 
respect to their production skills and their consumption preferences. More precisely, 
agents of type 1,2, and 3 produce one unit of 2H, 3H, and 1H, respectively, imme­
diately after having consumed one unit of 1H, 2H, and 3^, respectively, which is 
the only good they derive utility from. Low-quality goods, while being held by a 
positive proportion of agents, are neither produced nor consumed. All goods can be 
stored at zero costs, independent of quality, but in each period storage capacity is 
limited to one unit of one good only.
Consequently, the proportions of high and low quality goods, denoted by q and 
(1 — <?), respectively, q G (0,1), remain constant throughout time, q is assumed to 
be identical for all three types of goods.
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Let
oo
Uk = E o £ /3 'u ( t j )  (2.1)
t= 0
represent a type-k-agent’s expected lifetime utility function (k =  1 ,2 ,3), discounted 
to the present, where (3 £ (0,1) is the discount factor and u(iJt ) is the instantaneous 
(net) utility for an agent who has iJ immediately after bargaining at tim e t.
{u , if i = k and j  = H  at tn  u  • < 2 ' 2 )0, otherwise,
u > 0 being the instantaneous net utility of consumption and immediate production.
The crucial feature of the model is the distribution of information about the goods’ 
qualities. It is assumed to be common knowledge th a t each agent of some type 
always recognises the quality of his respective consumption and production good, 
but the quality of the good which is neither produced nor consumed (the third good, 
hereafter) can be observed if and only if he is in possession of it. He cannot tell 
apart high and the low quality of the third good as long as it is in the inventory of 
another agent.
Trade is organised as a stochastic matching process. More precisely, bilateral bar­
gaining takes place between agents who meet at random  each period. As for all 
three types the number of agents is infinitely large and drawings are independent, 
the cross-section distribution of pairwise meetings is almost surely constant.
Once a m atch has formed agents observe the varieties of goods in each o ther’s 
inventory, but not necessarily their qualities and certainly not the type of an agent 
they are confronted with. They play the following simple bargaining game. After 
inspection of inventories agents decide whether to trade or not. Only if both agents 
are willing to do so inventories are swapped, whereas otherwise both agents hold 
on to their goods. Thereafter the pair separates, regardless of whether trade has 
occurred or not.
Throughout the analysis we will confine ourselves to symmetric equilibria which,
Fiat Money and Quality Uncertainty 27
at this stage, we roughly define as a profile of bargaining strategies such tha t each 
agent’s utility Uk is maximised subject to the trading technology described above.
In the next section we dem onstrate tha t the assumptions about the information 
structure have a number of implications which simplify the analysis considerably. 
Before that, however, a few words should be said about the use of a random-matching 
model.
2.2.2 Random  M atching vs. Interm ediation
It has been pointed out in the introduction tha t even though the decision-making 
in the Walrasian framework is decentralised the processes of finding market-clearing 
prices and physically exchanging goods are not. The concept of an auctioneer in­
volves an extreme degree of centralisation. In contrast, the random-matching model 
used in this chapter is at the opposite end of the centralisation scale.
Some readers may argue that this other, fully decentralised extreme is just as un­
realistic as the Arrow-Debreu framework. An individual who wants to buy a good 
usually does not wait until he bumps into someone who happens to be selling just 
tha t good, and naturally the same can be said for the seller himself. Instead, it is 
much more likely tha t a number of agents will decide to act as intermediaries by 
setting up trading posts whose geographical location is sufficiently well-known to 
both buyers and sellers.
However, one can counter this criticism by showing tha t the principle ideas of our 
search model with private information about goods qualities carry over straight­
forwardly to a framework with interm ediated structures. The notion of division of 
labour is not confined to physical production but can be readily extended to the 
provision of intermediation services. Specialisation in trading just one particular 
type of good may be beneficial in many ways, such as lower unit cost of storage 
or transportation. More importantly, however, by focusing on one good only, a 
shop-keeper, for instance, is able to develop a high level of expertise in the quality
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assessment of tha t good. There is a possibility tha t an interm ediary uses his superior 
knowledge to extract a rent from his less informed customers. However, in a world 
with many competitors and with a reputation for providing quality at stake, buyers 
may benefit from the presence of well-informed intermediaries not only through a 
reduction of search costs but also because of a reduced probability of acquiring an 
inferior product. In that case, specialisation in quality recognition improves Pareto 
efficiency.
However, in order for this type of specialisation to be feasible, the existence of an 
easily recognisable medium of exchange such as fiat money, e.g., is required.
2.3 Implications of the Information Structure
2.3.1 A W eak-Dom inance R esult
Since each variety appears both in high and low quality there are six different goods 
in the economy, all of which could be held by each type of agent. However, we apply 
a string of arguments to reduce the number of goods each rational agent may hold 
to three.
We begin by noting that a utility-maximiser does not store his consumption good 
since it is obviously preferable to consume it immediately and enter the next round 
with a newly produced good.
We will use our first proposition to rule out situations in which agents knowingly give 
up a high-quality good for a low-quality good, since it is at least weakly preferred 
not to do so.
PROPOSITION 1.1: A strategy that prescribes to knowingly swap a good of high 
quality for  a good of low quality is weakly dominated.
Proof: To prove this proposition we will use a series of observations which allow the 
deletion of strictly and weakly dominated strategies.
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(i) Not choosing ‘trade with certainty5 when a consumption good is offered is strictly 
dominated.
(ii) Consider a type-&-agent with a low-quality good recognisable to an agent of 
the same type. If the latter strictly prefers this good to some high-quality good he 
himself holds, there would not be trade because the former agent would want to 
hold on to his good (identical preferences).
(iii) Consider a type-fc-agent with either his own production good. In any bargaining 
situation with an agent of type a (a =£ k) who is a consumer of k ’s production good, 
our type-/c-agent can sell it with certainty (if he wishes to do so) because of (i); 
hence, the low-quality version of the same good cannot be more marketable. If he 
meets an agent of yet another type 6, b ^  a /  k, unable to distinguish between 
qualities, the two goods will be equally marketable. Overall, holding the production 
good is at least as beneficial for the agent as holding the low-quality version thereof. 
There is no gain from giving up the former for the latter.
(iv) Next compare a type-A;-agent holding the high-quality version of his third good. 
In any bargaining situation with an agent of type b (consumer of the third good) our 
type-/c-agent can sell it with certainty (if he wishes to do so) because of (i); hence, 
the low-quality version cannot be more marketable. If he meets an agent of type a 
(producer of the third good), we infer from (iii) tha t the high-quality version is at 
least as tradable as the low-quality version. The overall conclusion is again tha t our 
type-£;-agent would not benefit by giving up the former for the latter.
(v) In order for consumption to occur at all the third good must be acquired by 
some agents in some periods. This together with (iv) implies tha t the third good 
of high quality is valued at least as highly as the production good (of high quality) 
and therefore at least as highly as the low-quality version of the production good 
(from (iii)).
(vi) Suppose our type-k-agent values his production good less than the low-quality 
version of the consumption good. That would be possible only if agents preferred
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the low-quality version of their production good to their production good (of high 
quality), which was ruled out by (iii). Hence, this leads to a contradiction. □
This proposition allows us to argue tha t in stationary symmetric equilibria agents 
will not hold the low quality-versions of their consumption or production goods 
because acquiring them  would not benefit them .2
2.3.2 Possible M atches and Information D istribution
It follows from the previous subsection th a t each agent will hold either his production 
good (P  hereafter), the high-quality version of his third good (H ) or the low-quality 
version of his th ird  good (L). Inventory distributions are triples (p, Z,/i), where p, 
Z, and h represent the proportion of type-A:-agents holding P , P, H , respectively, 
k = 1,2,3. Obviously, p +  / +  h = 1, and since the number of low quality goods 
remains constant throughout time, p +  h =  q and I = 1 — q.
Define the set of commodities an agent can hold as S  :=  {P, L ,H } .  Furthermore, 
denote with yss> G [0,1] the probability tha t a specific agent holding 3 is willing to 
trade it for s', and with Ys>s G [0,1] the probability of meeting an agent with s' 
willing to exchange it for s, Vs, s' G S.
Stationary inventory holdings are then governed by a Markov process with a time- 
invariant transition probability distribution function given by y Ss'Ys >s , V s ,s ' G S.
An agent’s optim isation problem is then equivalent to finding a function tha t solves 
the Bellman functional equation V s G 5,
V(s) = max/? 2  V ( S’)yss,Ys,s , (2.3)ye ct s'es
where F (s) is an agent’s valuation of good s G S.
2Proposition 1.1 does not enable us to exclude the trivial equilibrium where all commodities are 
always accepted regardless of quality and where therefore trade always takes place. Note, however, 
that this equilibrium would not survive the introduction of a trembling-hand-perfection criterion.
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We now analyse the distribution of information in all possible meetings. Consider 
an agent of type 1 carrying 2^,3L, or 3H, as depicted at the top of Table 2.3.2. All 
possible matches with different type-good combinations are listed on the left. The 
cell entries indicate how information is distributed in the associated m atch (from the 
viewpoint of the type-l-agent), or, whenever such a statem ent can be made already, 
whether trade occurs or not.
No trade occurs (N) if one of the agents matched detects a low-quality good, or if 
one of them  is offered to swap his H  for what may turn  out to be an L. W ithout 
loss of generality we can include situations in which two identical goods are offered. 
If our agent holds his P  (2^) and is offered a third good he is the uninformed party 
(U) in a relationship with asymmetric information; trade may or may not occur. If 
he is holding L or H  (3L or 3^) he is never willing to trade if he is uninformed (N), 
but he may be as the privately informed side (I) when he meets agents of the same 
type holding P. For an agent in possession of H  there are two situations in which 
both goods’ high qualities are public information (C); trade may or may not take 
place. Finally, we can identify two occurrences of double coincidence of wants where 
trade takes place with certainty.
Corresponding matrices for type-2 and type-3-agents are presented in Tables 2.3.2 
and 2.3.2, respectively.
Thus, trade evolves as follows. Iterated weak dominance has ruled out trade when 
at least on side detects a low quality good. This case occurs when L is offered to an 
agent who consumes or produces H.
Crucial to the analysis are situations with asymmetric information. Below we iden­
tify the conditions under which an agent of some type is willing to give up his P  for 
a third good tha t can be used as a medium of exchange. Recall tha t this third good 
can be of low (L ) or of high quality ( # ) ,  each with positive probability.
Let x and (1 — x)  denote the probabilities with which an uninformed agent accepts 
and refuses to trade, respectively, x £ [0,1], in a situation where he is uninformed.







1(2") N I I
1(3L) U N N
1(3") U N N
2(3") u N N
2(1L) N N N
2(1") D N C
3(1") I N D
3(2L) N N N
3(2") N N C
Table 2.1: Information structure in matches involving type 1
2 2 2
3" 1L 1"
2(3") N I I
2(1L) U N N
2(1") u N N
3(1") u N N
3(2L) N N N
3(2") D N C
1(2") I N D
1(3L) N N N
1(3") N N C
Table 2.2: Information structure in matches involving type 2
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3 3 3
l H 2l 2h
3(1") N I I
3(2L) U N N
3(2*) u N N
1(2*) u N N•T''
COr-H N N N
1(3*) D N C
2(3*) I N D
2(1L) N N N
2(1") N N C
Table 2.3: Information structure in matches involving type 3
For an economy to be active it is necessary tha t a positive proportion of agents 
trades indirectly, i.e. via the good they do not produce nor consume and whose 
quality they do not know unless they are in possession of it; otherwise every agent 
would be forced to keep his production good or the low-quality good he was endowed 
with initially. In other words, there must be positive probability th a t a type-fc-agent 
with his production good P  is willing to give it up for a third good whose quality 
he can observe only after acquisition. For this to be optimal behaviour the expected 
valuation of holding the third good must be at least as high as the valuation assigned 
to holding P.  To facilitate notation we define vs :=  V (s), V s £ S.
The following proposition shows that the valuation of P , up, is always strictly greater 
than the one of L, up, except for the trivial case of a completely inactive economy 
where both are equal to zero. For an uninformed agent to accept trade it is then 
necessary tha t up strictly dominates up.
PROPOSITION 1.2: Given the informational assumptions either 0 < vl < vp or 
vl = vp = 0.
Proof: Consider an agent of some type k, k = 1 ,2,3, holding L. Since agents of a 
different type recognise his L as being of low quality they will refuse to trade. Only
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for an agent of the same type holding P  it might be preferable to accept trade tha t 
with a probability strictly between zero and one leaves him with L. Thus, with L 
the agent can never directly acquire his consumption good.
In contrast, this is possible with P  if there is positive probability th a t double coin­
cidence of wants occurs; taking into account tha t (3 £ (0,1), it has therefore higher 
value than L. If the probability of acceptance is zero, vp =  0; but then vl = 0 since 
with L our agent can at best acquire P.  □
For the discussion of active equilibria we have to keep in mind th a t agents being 
offered their P  are willing to trade if they hold L, but will refuse to swap if they are 
in possession of H . The la tter follows from Corollary 1.3:
COROLLARY 1.3: For an equilibrium to be active, i.e. to have x* >  0 for at least 
some agents, it is necessary that vp < vp.
Proof: Activity implies vp > 0. From Proposition 1.2 we know th a t then vl < vp. 
Suppose vp > vp.  Then x > 0 cannot be an optimal strategy for any agent since 
this would lead to a negative expected gains from trade. □
2.4 The M odel without Uncertainty about Quality
Before analysing the problems associated with quality uncertainty, it is useful to 
study a benchmark model where quality uncertainty is tem porarily suspended such 
that every agent always recognises L as being of low quality. Since there are no 
problems of asymmetric information here, Corollary 1.3 does not have to hold. Let 
x and X  now refer to the strategy adopted by agents holding P  and being offered 
H  whereas x and X  refer to the reverse situation.
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2.4.1 The Problem  o f a Typical Agent
Consider an agent immediately after production, having P  in store. In the stochastic 
matching process he meets an agent of type 1, 2, or 3, each with a probability of 
1/3.
W ith probability p /3  he meets an agent of the same type with P , and with proba­
bility h / 3 he meets an agent with an identical good who is neither a consumer nor 
a producer of it. It is obvious that in these situations there is no scope for trade.
W ith probability (1 — q) he encounters agents with goods of low quality all of which 
he recognises in this benchmark case.
W ith probability p/3  he meets an agent who holds and has produced his H  and 
who would like to swap since P  is tha t agent’s consumption good. In this case trade 
requires vp > vp. However, if the counterparty were an agent of the same type, the 
reverse inequality vp  <  vp would be a necessary condition for trade to take place. 
These two inequalities imply that, in an active symmetric equilibrium where H  is 
given up for P  with positive probability, vp  =  vp.
If our agent bumps into someone with his consumption good, it is either a consumer 
of P  (probability h / 3), in which case there is double coincidence of wants and 
therefore trade, or it is a producer of his consumption good (probability p /3), in 
which case trade takes place with probability X .
For a given ( X , X )  optim al choices of (re, a;) have to satisfy our agent’s valuation 
function for good P ,
0
v p =  3 pvp +  h p  +  ( h x X v p  +  h(l  — (2.4)
+  ^  [{pXVH +  p{ 1 -  x)vp)  +  Ivp +  h(u  +  U p )]
+  j  [{pX(u +  vp) +  p (l -  X )vp )  +  Ivp +  hvp] .
An agent unfortunate enough to be endowed with L in the beginning will be forced
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to retain it, since everyone else recognises the poor quality of the good and no other 
agent would ever accept it. This is reflected by the function
VL = ^ (3 u l) , (2.5)
or vl =  0.
Entering the period with H  he will again refuse to participate in any trade activity 
with another agent having a good of variety 3 or with a low quality good in store. 
If he meets someone with his P , it will either be an agent of the same type (with 
probability p/3)  or a consumer of H  (with h/3).  While the la tter strictly favours 
trade, our agent is indifferent if and only if vh =  up, which must hold in an active 
symmetric equilibrium.
W ith probability p/3  our agent meets someone with his consumption good who is 
also its producer, which means that there is double coincidence of wants. If it is a 
producer of H  trade takes place with probability X .  Thus, given (X, X ), optim al 
choices of ( x ,x )  satisfy our agent’s valuation function for H ,
vh =  ^  [(;p x X v P +  p( 1 -  x X ) v H) +  Ivh +  hvH] (2.6)
o
pvn +  Ivh +  (h X (u  +  vp) +  h( 1 -
+  3
+  J  +  Vp) +  ^VH +  (hzvp  +  h( 1 -  x)vH)] .
The system of equations (4), (5) and (6) can be rew ritten in m atrix form as
T v  =  w (2.7)
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where, defining r  |  — 3, the transition m atrix
0
T  :=
r  +  (p +  h X ) x   —(p + h X ) x
0 r 0
_ — (1 +  x)p — h (X  +  x) 0 r  +  (1 +  x)p +  h ( X  +  x)
' v P ' ' p X u  +  hu '
v := VL , w := 0
.VH. _pu +  h X u  _
2.4.2 Existence and Characterisation of a F irst-B est Efficient Equilib­
rium
Let Uk{ x , x \ X , X )  denote the expected lifetime utility of a type-fc-agent playing 
(x ,x ), conditional on all others playing (X, X ) .
DEFINITION 1.1: A stationary symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game without 
uncertainty is a pair (x*,x*), x*,x* £ [0,1], which satisfies
(i) Uk(x*:x*; X * ,X * )  > Uk(x, x\ X *, X*) for all agents of type k (k = 1,2,3) and 
all x , x  £ [0,1] (optimality),
(ii) p[(p +  hX*)x*] =  h[( 1 +  x*)p +  h(X*  -f x*)] (stationarity) and
(iii) x * — X*,x* = X* (symmetry).
The following proposition can now be formulated.
P r o p o s i t i o n  1.4: Any pair (x*,x*) with
and
5* = 1 ----- —  (1 - x ' )
q - p
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is a stationary symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game without uncertainty, such 
that vp = vh > 0 and vp =  0. In particular there exists such an equilibrium 
with (x*,x*) — (1,1) for which the stationary inventory distribution is given by
¥ . 1 - 9 . 1 ) -




ph( 1 — x) +  2h2 ’
and with vp =  vh > 0 optimality implies equal probability to consume in the next 
period for P  and H,  i.e. px +  h = p +  h x , which can be expressed as
x =  1 — j-( l  — x).
Equating right-hand sides and rearranging terms we obtain the quadratic equation
p2x 2 — p(p +  h)x — (2 h2 — p2) = 0.
The relevant solution for x  is
x ' - \ { p + i f + 8 ^ - 4) -
Using h = q — p, this can be simplified such that the expression for x* given in the 
proposition. Substituting x* for x  in the optim ality condition gives us x*.
Finally, we set x* =  x* =  1 in both the optimality condition and the stationarity 
equation to obtain the corresponding inventory distribution. □
In our setting a first best efficient outcome is implementable without money if we 
assume away all information asymmetries. Note tha t the agents with low quality 
goods are virtually excluded from the economy; they are forced to remain completely 
inactive.
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2.5 The M odel under Private Information w ithout Fiat M oney
Next we study the model with private information, i.e. we return  to the uncertainty 
assumptions outlined in section 2.3. We raise the question whether under these 
circumstances media of exchange can still evolve and how powerful they are in facil­
itating trade. We identify an equilibrium for an active economy, i.e. an equilibrium 
in which
vL < v p  <  v h - (2 .8 )
As a consequence, x* =  X* = 0.
2.5.1 Inform ation U pdating and Expected Gains from Trade
The crucial question is what happens in a bargaining situation with asymmetric 
information. Consider an agent with his P  meeting someone willing to trade our 
agent’s nonrecognisable third good. The la tter agent must be either of the same 
type as he himself is and carry L, or a consumer of P . He cannot be of the same 
type and carry H  because for such an agent giving up H  for P  implies a violation of 
(2.8). Therefore, our agent infers tha t with conditional probability l/(l-\-p) he faces 
someone trying to get rid of L and with conditional probability p/( l  +  p) someone 
offering H.
In both cases it becomes common knowledge tha t the agent with P  has a high- 
quality good. If tha t was not the case both agents offering the th ird  good would 
detect the low quality and refuse to trade.
The optim al strategy x  of our agent maximises expected gains from trade
I p
——  [xvL +  (1 -  x)vp] +  ——  [xvH +  (1 -  x)vp\ -  vp (2.9)
I +  p I +  p
or, equivalently,
— [lvL +  pvH -  (I +  p)vP] (2.10)
I +  p
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with respect to x given X.
2.5.2 The Problem  of an Agent
Given the three possible characteristics of a bargaining situations, i.e. detection of 
low quality and immediate separation, double coincidence of wants and swap with 
certainty, or one-sided asymmetric information in the trade of a production good 
against a third good, we can write down an agent’s valuations of holding P , L, and 
H  as
VP — \  \p vp +  J (XVL +  (1 -  x)vp)  +  hvp)O
+ ^ \p{xVH  +  (1 -  x)vp)  +  Ivp +  h(u +  Up)]
o
+ 7  [P W u +  vp ) +  (1 -  X)vp)  + Ivp + hvp] ,
(2 .11)
v l  =  x  [[p (X vp  +  (1 -  X ) v l )  + l v L +  h v L] +  2 v l ] , (2 .12)
v H =  ^  [2vH +  \p(u +  v P ) +  l v H +  hvH]] (2.13)
As in the previous section we note them  as a m atrix equation
Ti i  /v =  w (2 . 14)
where v' =  v, the new transition m atrix is given by
T  : =
r  +  Ix +  px —Ix —px 
—p X  r +  p X  0
— p  0  r  +  P _
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and the right-hand side is now
' p X u  -j- hu 
w' := 0
pu
Using Cram er’s rule we calculate the valuations of np, vl and vh as
Vp =  j ^ 7! ^ r  +  p X ^ r  +  p ^ p X  +  ^  +  p 2 x (r  +  p X ^\ 7
VL =  j r 7! p^X((r  +  p ^ p X  +  ^ +  p 2 x (p X \^ 7
and





Substituting this into (2.10), the expression to be maximised with respect to x can 
now be written as
u x
|T'| (1 + p )
\pr(r -f pX)(p  — p X  — h) — lr(r  +  p)(pX  +  h ) ] . (2.18)
Note tha t the value of A  does not depend on the agent’s strategy x but only on 
the other players’ strategies X .  Noting that \T'\ > 0, it follows tha t his best-reply 
correspondence is given by
' {0} for A  <  0
^(X ) £ < [0,1] for A  = 0
1 {1} for A > 0 .
2.5 .3  E x is te n c e  a n d  C h a ra c te r is a tio n  of an  U n iq u e  E q u ilib r iu m
DEFINITION 1.2: A stationary symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game with un­
certainty is a value x *, x* £ [0,1], which satisfies
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(i) Uk(x*]X*) > Uk(x;X*)  for all agents of type k (k = 1,2,3,) and all x G [0,1] 
(optimality),
(ii) plx* +  p2x* =  plX*  +  ph (stationarity) and
(iii) x* =  X* (symmetry).
The next proposition states existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1.5: There exists a unique stationary symmetric Nash equilibrium in 
the game with uncertainty, x* , with 0 <  x* < 1.
Proof: Set x = X .  Then stationarity requires h = p X , implying p =  q / ( l  +  X )  and 
h = X q / (  1 +  X ) .  Set I = I — q. After substitution into (2.18) A  = 0 if and only if
(r +  pX)(p  -  2p X )  -  2(1 -  q)X(r  +  p) =  0, (2.19)
where division by p and substituting for it yields
1 +  XJ
(1 -  2X) -  2(1 -  q)X « • ( ! + * )  , ! =  0 . (2 .20)
Setting X  = 1 the left hand side of (2.20) becomes negative, implying tha t A  < 0 
for which the best reply is z ( l)  =  0, whereas for X  = 0  the left hand side is positive 
and A  > 0 for which the best response is x(0) =  1. In both cases x ^  X  such tha t 
symmetry is violated. Since the left hand side is continuous and strictly monotonic 
in X  there exists a unique fixed point X * with 0 <  X* < 1 for which (2.20) holds 
and x(X*)  =  X*  is a best reply. □
COROLLARY 1.6: There is no efficient stationary symmetric Nash equilibrium in 
the game with uncertainty, i.e. one with x = 1.
Proof: Follows directly from the proof of the previous proposition. □
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Note tha t x* solves the cubic equation
2(1 - « )  , ,----------- x  +
2(1 - q )
+  1 +  (1 /r) 2 , x  +
2(1 - g ) ^  1 ~  3(1 — <?)
Two comparative-statics results are of particular interest. It is of little surprise tha t 
dx*/dq  > 0. W ith an increasing proportion of low quality goods it becomes more 
and more difficult to establish the third good as a medium of exchange since it is 
more likely to end up with a low quality good.
Moreover, it can be shown that dx*/d(3 > 0, implying th a t the probability with 
which the th ird good becomes a medium of exchange is higher if individuals discount 
the future less strongly. The reason is that agents are less worried about the higher 
waiting cost associated with the acquisition of a low quality good.
Thus, we have established that the first-best result from the model without quality 
uncertainty cannot be implemented if we assume tha t a specific good’s quality is 
not recognised by all agents. This result holds regardless of param eter values.
2.6 A M odel w ith Quality Uncertainty and with Fiat M oney
2.6.1 Introduction of M oney and the A gent’s Problem
The next step involves extending our model by introducing fiat money, M.  Apart 
from having the usual properties of intrinsic uselessness and inconvertibility, fiat 
money in our model is characterised by the fact tha t it appears in uniform quality 
such that there is no problem of quality recognition for any agent.
The monetary authorities introduce m units, m £ (0,1), of fiat money by buying 
from qam  agents with high-quality goods and from m (l — qa) agents with low- 
quality goods, where a  is a param eter in the unit interval. Each of these agents 
receives exactly one unit of fiat money in exchange for the good he holds. Fiat 
money has the same storage properties as the other goods, ie. it is stored at zero
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cost and one unit exhausts the entire inventory capacity.
The crucial difference to the analysis of the previous model is tha t agents do not 
have to rely exclusively on the heterogeneous third good in order to accomplish 
indirect trade, ie. to prevent the economy from complete inactivity, because the 
homogeneous good fiat money can be used as a medium of exchange, too. In the 
present model we extend the agents’ strategy space by adding a second dimension, 
with elements <j> 6 [0,1] representing the probabilities of swapping when money is 
involved in a bargaining situation. For simplicity we focus on identifying equilibria 
in which money is not traded for the third good, i.e. v>h < vm in an equilibrium 
where money is always accepted since good H  cannot serve the purpose of being a 
medium of exchange as well as fiat money can.
The system of valuation functions for a representative agent is
Tn // /V — W ( 2 .21 )
where, after defining / :=  1 — q — m (l — qa) and the proportion of agents holding 
high-quality goods A := q(l — am ), the matrices are given by
ji// t_
x +  px  -f mcf) —Ix —px —mcf)
- p X r +  p X  0 0
~P 0 r -f p +  mcf) —m(f)
- A $ 0 0 r +  A$
’  vp ' p X u  +  hu
v l 0
v" : = ,u>" : =
VH pu
VM A <Pu
denotes the probability with which other agents accept fiat money in trade.
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2.6.2 Equilibrium: Existence and Characterisation
DEFINITION 1.3: A stationary symmetric monetary Nash equilibrium in the game 
with uncertainty is a pair (x*,<j>*), x*, (f>* E [0,1], which satisfies
(i) Uk(x*, <f*;X*, $*) >  Uk(x, <^>); X*, F*) for all agents o f  type k (k = 1,2,3,) and 
all x,<j> £ [0,1] (optimality),
(ii) p lx* +  p2x* +  pmcff =  plx* +  ph +  Am$* (stationarity),
(iii) x * = X* and f>* =  (symmetry) and
(iv) <j>* > 0 (fiat money valued).
PROPOSITION 1.7: There exists a nonempty subset of  the interval (0,1) with the 
following property: For each element m  of this subset there is a stationary symmetric 
monetary Nash equilibrium in the economy with quality uncertainty, (x*,<f*) with 
0 <  x* < 1 and <f* =  1, such that v i  < vp < vh < vm (consistency with transition 
matrix T").
Proof: Set f  = $  = 1 and, without loss of generality u = 1. Stationarity is then 
equivalent to p2x = ph m h , and it can be checked th a t stationarity requires
q( 1 — am)  — m +  J[q{ 1 — am ) — m]2 +  4(1 -f x)mq(  1 — a m )
p = ------------------------------------ 2 ( I T ^ ) ------------------------------------- ’ (2-22)
and h = q( 1 — am )  — p. First we prove the ranking of the valuations. From (4.18) 
we can see tha t
vL = \pX/ (r +  pX)]vP, (2.23)
from which the first inequality in the proposition follows. Substituting this into the 
equilibrium condition (2.10), p(yu — vp) +  1 ( v l  — vp) = 0, yields
W +  p(r +  px) 
vh = -----}— ;----- .— vP, (2.24)p{r +  px)
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from which vp < vp  immediately follows since r and I are bounded away from 
zero. Finally, system (4.18) reveals tha t (r +  p +  m )vp  — tuvm =  p{ 1 +  vp). Since 
1 +  vp — this is equivalent to
A(r  +  p) A  A m  
VM =  p(r + A) + A m VH'
and therefore vh < v m - 
Because of (2.23) and since
(2.25)
vm =  [A/(r  +  A])(l +  vP),
(4.18) can be simplified to yield the reduced system T"v"  =  w" where




- p - f z x  r  +  p +  m_
PX  + h A  -AmVp * //, w  : =
_VH _
+A
The solution to this system is given by v" — {T”) w", with
\T"\
r +  p A  m px
„  I A m  „  i Irx  I  ,  I m r
I P + 7 T I  r + T ^ x  + P X + 7 U
This yields
vP = | T > (r A p A m)  ( A — (1 — x)p  +  A p x  ( p A  ^ m
and
1 /  Am
VH ~  | f  "| v  +  r +  A
r  +  A
( ! - / ) - ( ! -  2x)p A
r  +  A
r 2 +  rpx A rlx  
r A  px
(2.26)
(i) Set X  = x = 0. (We can do so since, as in Proposition 1.5, the crucial expression
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below does not depend on x but on X  only.) Then p = A, and we get
and
^ (r +  m)
Remember th a t for an equilibrium it is necessary th a t A  =  0. Note tha t ut,(0) =  0. 
Then X  = x = 0 cannot be an equilibrium if (1 — / — m)ufj(O) — (1 — m)vp(0) >  0. It 
can be checked tha t for each q and r  there exists an m  > 0 for which this inequality
(2.10) for m  =  0 yields, after some manipulations, 2pi >  0, which is always the case 
given q is bounded away from 0 and 1. But then there exists a m  > 0 such tha t this 
condition is still satisfied.
By applying a fixed-point theorem as in the proof of the previous proposition, we can 
find a unique symmetric mixed-strategy monetary equilibrium (with general money 
acceptance) for each value of m  > 0 such tha t X  = x  =  0 and X  = x =  1 do not 
constitute equilibria. □
Note tha t there are symmetric m onetary equilibria with barter where </>* < 1. How­
ever, this type of equilibrium ceases to exist for values of <j> such th a t A<f> < p because 
then vm < vh and money is no longer accepted by an agent with H  in store. Here, 
we focus solely on the best possible outcome where money is always accepted with 
certainty.
Thus, we have found an equilibrium of the economy by introducing fiat money and 
letting agents trade their production goods for fiat money or for another medium of
holds.
(ii) Set X  = x = 1. This cannot be an equilibrium since substituting (2.24) into
exchange.
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2.7 Welfare Comparison
We measure welfare as the per-period consumption in the economy. More precisely, 
welfare W  is given by
W  (m) = p(px +  h) +  ph +  mq(  1 — am).  (2.27)
The welfare level of the nonmonetary economy without quality uncertainty equals 
q2 and dominates the welfare levels of both the nonmonetary economy with qual­
ity uncertainty and the m onetary economy. That is, the inefficiencies caused by 
asymmetric information cannot be removed by the introduction of fiat money. The 
introduction of fiat money into the economy without quality uncertainty would be 
detrimental to its welfare. This implies tha t in our models fiat money does not con­
tribute anything to alleviate the double-coincidence-of-wants problem. The existing 
goods are sufficient to fulfil this role.
A more interesting question is concerned with the comparison between the economies 
with quality uncertainty. For this it is necessary to examine the effect of a slight 
increase in fiat money on the welfare of a previously nonmonetary economy.
PROPOSITION 6: For each q E (0 ,1)  there exist values of  m  >  0 and a  E (0,1] for  
which W  is higher than at m  = 0.
Proof: Note tha t, due to the stationarity requirement, (2.27) can be rew ritten as
W (m )  = 3ph +  m(2h  +  p). (2.28)
Keeping in mind tha t p and h are functions of m, and tha t h =  <?(1 — am)  — p, 
differentiation of (2.28) with respect to m  at m  =  0 yields
= 3(9 -  2 p ) ^  ~  3apq +  2h +  p. (2.29)
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Totally differentiating p2x = h(p + m)  (stationarity condition) with respect to m  at 
m =  0 , we obtain
p2^  + 2 p x Z  =  { q - p ) ( l  +  S ] - a q p - ( 2 - 3 0 )
We can also derive from the stationarity condition tha t
2 dx  dp
p d ^  = h ~ q^
and by substituting this into (2.30) we have an equation th a t is linear in J ^ , the 
solution to which is given by
dx  aqp
d m  q — ph
This allows us to rewrite (2.29) as
-  ~ Z a q p 2  { ^ X p h ) + 2 h + p - (2-31)
For each q 6  (0,1) 2h -f p > 0. Thus, we can always find a value for a  th a t is 
sufficiently small to ensure that 9^ ° -' is strictly positive. □
Intuitively speaking, even though raising m means tha t there are less consumption 
goods around (if a  > 0 ), agents benefit through a shift of a positive proportion of 
the population from goods with a relatively lower to a good with a relatively higher 
valuation, ie. fiat money. This reflects the way in which money facilitates bilateral 
exchange.
As a consequence of the special assumption of limited storage capacity the choice 
of a  is constrained. Due to this specific storage technology, money drives out high- 
quality goods such tha t their stocks at any moment in tim e are lower in the m onetary 
economy than in the nonmonetary economy.
A substantial amount of indirect barter is still carried out in order to ensure occur­
rences of double-coincidence-of-wants events, which are fully efficient with respect
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to both the information problem (qualities of both goods are immediately recog­
nised) and the waiting cost problem (no additional waiting cost for the agent with 
his production good in store).
Another interesting welfare aspect of the model revealed by simulation experiments 
is the behaviour of W  when m  is increased further. It can be shown for sufficiently 
high q tha t there is an optimal quantity of money at the point where m  takes the 
value for which vjj — %  such tha t the agents are satiated with money balances. 
At this point x* — 0, i.e. there is no more barter and the equilibrium collapses to 
a purely m onetary one. If the quantity of money is expanded beyond this point, 
welfare decreases and becomes eventually lower than in the nonm onetary economy 
with uncertainty. This happens when the loss from less high-quality goods is just 
outweighed by the gains from facilitated transactions.
2.8 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has dem onstrated how under certain conditions rational agents choose 
a good without quality uncertainties and with good resale expectations to be a 
medium of exchange. The results have been derived under the assumption of risk- 
neutrality. W ith risk-aversion inefficiency would increase with or without fiat money. 
However, the relative gain from introducing fiat money into the economy would be 
larger than in the previous model. The study shows tha t fiat money may have 
positive value because of  rather than despite its intrinsic futility once we emphasise 
its recognisability features.
One interesting conclusion can be drawn from the previous analysis if one associates 
the quality uncertainty with a range of financial assets (check-drawable deposits, 
bonds, stocks, etc.). While it is true tha t we have not explicitly modelled credit 
relationships, the kind of quality uncertainties encountered here are not completely 
unrelated to such assets. Their rates of return can usually not be foreseen perfectly 
and often there is the risk of the debtor defaulting. The model reinterpreted tha t way
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then explains why financial assets are not always accepted as medium of exchange 
but money is. Financial assets are linked with agents who promise to pay back 
but whose future income streams are uncertain or who may indulge in fraudulent 
activities. Such problems do not arise with unbacked currency.
Another implication of the model is tha t it seems not only very improbable that 
m onetary economies are replaced by pure credit economies in the future, but also 
tha t it would be inefficient to do so. It is beneficial and necessary to have a standard 
good (paper money or some other appropriate commodity) upon which all assets 
are based.
Chapter 3
R eputation, Internal Finance and 
the Incentives to Invest
3.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the disruptive effects of reputational and financial distress on 
a firm ’s incentives to invest when it faces a set of external financiers who cannot 
directly observe its investment decisions. The unobservability of actions creates a 
moral-hazard problem in the relationship between the owner-manager (entrepreneur) 
of the firm and outside investors, which is shown to lead to inefficiently low levels of 
investment in a risky but productive technology. This in turn  forces some, especially 
younger, businesses into liquidation, even though from an efficiency point of view 
they should continue to operate.
The study also suggests tha t the presence of an outside option for the borrower 
induces a positive effect of reputation, as measured by expected productivity, and 
internal finance on incentives to invest. The reason is tha t with a better reputation 
or more internal finance the liquidation probability is lowered and therefore the 
expected return on investment higher. Consequently, the closer a firm gets to the 
liquidation point the smaller such investment incentives become.
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Both economists and policymakers have long suspected tha t many firms go into liq­
uidation even when this is not desirable from a social planner’s perspective. For some 
part this may be due to imperfections in the legal system which cause a suboptimal 
assignment of control rights over an insolvent business between different classes of 
claim ants .1 Even though the chapter is not without consequences for bankruptcy 
procedures, and some aspects of adm inistration and restructuring procedures will be 
considered, the focus of this chapter is on credit m arket imperfections and the effects 
that the presence of an outside option has on incentive dynamics. In other words, 
we are interested in the nature of inefficiencies th a t may lead too many businesses 
into insolvency in the first place.
Moral hazard is very prominent in the literature as an explanation for financial con­
straints and their effects on investment, and it also plays a key role here. According 
to a num ber of empirical studies (see, e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)), 
financing constraints seem to be most severe for firms with little own assets. While 
their paper views internal assets primarily as net worth of tangibles2 they may also 
encompass intangibles such as reputation. This study is an attem pt to show how 
both insufficient internal financing capacity and the learning process through which 
a reputation is formed can diminish incentives to ‘co-operate with lenders’ in a way 
which makes liquidating the business privately preferable to continuation even when 
the social net present value of doing so is negative.
Such an outcome contrasts a study on the industry selection process by Jovanovic 
(1982). In his paper, firms are not financially constrained such th a t they can always 
choose output levels tha t maximise the one-period surplus subject to the expected 
value of a cost function parameter. The true value of this param eter is learnt through 
Bayesian updating based on observed realisations over time. But since (explicit) 
credit m arket agency problems are absent from th a t model it is no surprise tha t the
1See Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1993) for a discussion of insolvency practices.
2Bernanke and Gertler (1990) also analyse the effect of a low net worth on the agency costs of 
investment.
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probabilities are first-best efficient.
As for the learning process, my contribution bears some similarity with a paper 
by Holmstrom (1982), which presents a model of a manager whose salary each 
period depends on his talent and effort as perceived by the owners of the firm .3 He 
establishes tha t there are managerial incentives tha t stem from the possibility of 
building a reputation which lead to a reduction of the gap between second-best and 
first-best efficient efforts, and hence, inefficiency due to nonobservability of efforts is 
not as strong as it would be without such managerial career concerns. However, the 
beneficial effects of the desire to acquire a reputation are strongest at the beginning 
of a career and wear off gradually as tim e goes on. The driving forces behind this 
result are th a t only short-term  contracts are feasible and th a t wage payments are 
made in advance, i.e. contingent on past performance data  only. Learning on the 
expected managerial talent evolves according to a Bayesian updating process which 
is the more erratic the earlier an observation is made. Therefore, the possibility to 
m anipulate the firm’s learning becomes smaller over tim e such tha t efforts decline 
continually over time.
The present chapter, which deals with incentives in the context of external financing, 
shows tha t this monotonicity is not necessarily preserved if one introduces outside 
options. More specifically, it is not always the case tha t the younger the firm the 
lesser the extent of underinvestment. In fact, it turns out th a t firm age has an 
ambiguous effect on incentives to invest. As in Holmstrom (1982) it is true that 
attem pts to m anipulate the signal to lenders become less effective. But at the 
same tim e the liquidation probability may be lowered ceteris paribus, if the firm has 
experienced a series of mainly good productivity realisations, which makes it less 
likely tha t current investment does not bear any return in the future.
The entrepreneur is infinitely-lived and chooses the size of operation in a risky 
technology. As in Diamond (1989) the analysis is facilitated by the assumption tha t
3For a somewhat different approach to Bayesian learning and investment, see Tonks (1981).
Reputation and Internal Finance 55
in each period there is a completely new set of lenders, which excludes feasibility of 
long-term contracts. The entrepreneur cannot credibly commit to choose a certain 
investment level.4 The reader may think of the entrepreneur as deciding about 
his own salary (or perquisites) after external funds have been provided, i.e. when 
outside investors no longer have direct control.5
The firm ’s entire output history is observable to the lenders at the beginning of 
each period, and so is the outcome realised at the end of the same period. The ob­
servability of output history enables each generation of external investors to update 
their beliefs about a firm ’s productivity, and the fact tha t current output is fully 
observable (and verifiable) suggests tha t the transfers specified by a contract should 
be fully contingent on outcomes, which will indeed be the case in this contribution.
It will be shown that a firm with a good reputation or high internal finance may be 
able reduce agency costs which not only leads to a higher to tal investment level but 
also reduces the exit probability. More precisely, the number of socially undesirable 
firm deaths is decreased as a consequence of the positive effect on incentives th a t is 
exerted by a good reputation or a relatively high level of own means.
The presence of financial constraints makes it more likely tha t, after a bad output 
realisation without immediate liquidation, a firms’ assets are eroded to a point 
where continuation ceases to be worthwhile. These inefficiencies give rise to the 
introduction of monitoring or certain provisions in the bankruptcy law tha t have a 
potential to improve the outcome.
There is a number of studies on reputation acquisition in debt markets. Diamond 
(1989), e.g., introduces a model with moral hazard and a ’significant’ amount of
4In this respect, the model is similar to Holmstrom (1982). Note that the assumption that funds 
are transferred to another party before any ’effort’ has been exerted appears more adequate in a 
credit market context than in the one of managerial salary determination since such a sequence of 
events is in the nature of a borrower-lender relationship.
5Again, a particular aspect of the ongoing debate on corporate governance serves as an illus­
tration of this point. The issue is whether companies should be forced to secure shareholders’ 
approval for executive salary awards.
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adverse selection. That reputation takes tim e to begin to work is true in th a t paper 
as well, i.e. the monotonicity result in Holmstrom (1982) does not necessarily hold 
there either, despite a rather different physical setup of the m odel.6
The presence of adverse selection ensures th a t in the beginning there may be a high 
proportion of ’b ad ’ types in the population of borrowers. After a number of defaults 
by those borrowers adverse selection becomes less and less im portant, leading to a 
decrease in interest rates. It then becomes worthwhile to pick safe projects in order 
to preserve the good reputation acquired so far.
However, the assumption that no new borrowers which can select undesirable projects 
can enter seems somewhat restrictive. It is therefore im portant to note tha t the 
model here does not feature adverse selection effects, and therefore its results do 
not rely on changes in the composition of the set of borrowers. In other words, 
the destruction of incentives to ’co-operate’ may occur even when there is only one 
borrower. The reason is that it is not only the age of the firm which determines in­
centives to invest but also the extent to which a firm is in (financial or reputational) 
distress .7 The financial and reputational state of a firm determines how close it gets 
to the exit point. The higher the probability of switiching to the outside option the 
more relevant becomes its value. If this value is independent of current investment, 
the expected return  on investment, and therefore the investment level, is lower.
The rem ainder of of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section outlines 
the framework of the model and establishes the occurrenceoccurence of underinvest­
ment in each period. In the third section the entrepreneur’s optim isation problem 
is formulated and, after establishing existence, uniqueness as well as differentia­
bility of the value function, it is demonstrated tha t the liquidation probability is
6Note that while Holmstrom (1982) features a moral hazard problem it does not have adverse 
selection.
7Novaes and L. (1994) also deals with the relation between financial distress and the collapse of 
incentives. In their paper, however, it is the capital structure and the organisational form chosen 
by the managers to entrench themselves, and not the existence of an outside option, that drives 
their model.
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ineffeciently high. In the section 3.4 we solve the entrepreneur’s and analyse the 
comparative statics of the model. Section 3.5 considers the roles of monitoring and 
the bankruptcy law for liquidation rates, before the last section briefly summarises 
and concludes the chapter.
3.2 The M odel
3.2.1 The F irm ’s Technology
Time evolves discretely as an infinite sequence of periods, t =  0 , 1,2 ,... The economy 
consists of two types of agents. There is a risk-neutral infinitely-lived entrepreneur 
and, following Diamond (1989), we assume that in each period there is a large 
number of lenders each of whom is alive for one period only. The entrepreneur is 
endowed with initial internal finance ao and with the access to a risky technology. 
Using this risky technology enables him to produce output
yt = Pt + n l n x t  (3.1)
of some good in period t from input (investment) x t . 7r is an exogenous productivity 
param eter, and the random variable pt =  p(zt) contributes to output in a time- 
dependent m anner.8 Its value is governed by the random variable zt € Z  =  IR, as 
defined by z t := fj +  et. r) £ IR, the true value of the firm’s productivity param eter, 
is not known to any agent, but at t =  0 all are aware th a t it is drawn from a 
normal distribution with mean tjq and variance with ho € 1R+ denoting the 
precision of beliefs. The disturbance term  et is not observable either but known to 
be independently, identically and normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ^  
in each period.
8Instead of assuming an additive productivity shock one may choose to formulate the model 
with a multiplicative shock. This would entail a non-constant first-best efficient investment level, 
but the results of this chapter would qualitatively not be affected otherwise.
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The function p : IR —> [p, p] transforms zt into a stochastic productivity param eter 
for each t.9 It is positive, strictly increasing and continuous with lim2-)._oo p(z) = 
p > 0 and limz_^oop(z) = p >  p.
As described below, external finance, bt, is determined on the credit m arket which is 
assumed to be perfectly competitive due to the large number of lenders. The latter 
have access to a safe storage technology which simply transforms one unit of input 
at the beginning of a period into R units of output at the end of the period .10
Given an amount of external finance, bt , the entrepreneur has to allocate his total 
means at the beginning of t, at +  &*, with at representing internal finance, between 
investment x t and consumption ct. W hatever is not used as production input is 
consumed immediately by the entrepreneur, i.e. ct =  at +  bt — x t, which yields 
current utility u(ct). u : IR+ —^  IR is continuous, increasing and concave.
3.2.2 Equilibrium on the Capital Market
Let us now consider in more detail to what extent the entrepreneur is able to 
raise funds from the external investors. Since lenders are alive for only one pe­
riod, long-term contracts are not feasible. However, all past information about the 
entrepreneur, i.e. his output levels and the total means he has disposed of in the 
beginning of each period, is publicly available to every generation.
Contracts are of the following type. At the beginning of the period some lenders give 
a total amount of bt to the entrepreneur who then consumes and invests. We assume 
that he cannot commit to repay more than an exogenously determined share 1 — p 
of the revenues tha t accrue after production, ptyt, with p £ [0 ,l) .n  Assume also
9p  may also capture effects of market structure on profitability, of developments on the demand 
side, or of product innovations.
10One may also think of the external investors as financial intermediaries with the possibility for 
refinancing at a time-independent net interest rate R  — 1.
11 Here one may think of a firm deciding not to pay out its entire profits as dividends but to 
retain a part of it.
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th a t output demand is perfectly price-elastic in every period such that pt = p = 1 
' i t .12 The share p of the revenues is retained by the entrepreneur and serves as next 
period’s internal finance. Thus, his financial assets evolve according to
at+1 =  py t. (3.2)
This form of contract can be justified by the fact tha t output is observable whereas 
the sequence of investment rates, is not. An optim al contract should be
based on the output realisations. Thus, we have a contingent contract rather than 
a standard debt contract as in Diamond (1989), where profits are non-observable. 
The contract we use here may not be optimal because we assume for simplicity 
th a t the entrepreneur does not optimise with respect to p, the share of revenues he 
would credibly promise to repay.13 We can therefore say th a t there are two sources 
of moral hazard, one being the non-contractibility of the investment shares and the 
other the commitment problem just m entioned .14
,0(77*) is the expected value of the productivity param eter at t. We then state the 
arbitrage condition tha t determines the level of external funds as
Rbt =  (1 -  p)[p(r}t) +  7r In x*(au rju ht)\, (3.3)
where x * is the value of x t which the lenders expect an optimising entrepreneur to 
choose, given the current state (at l r}f,ht). Thus, while x t is not observable to the 
lenders, they are able to infer its value from solving the entrepreneur’s optimisation 
problem (which is common knowledge). The condition simply says tha t the expected 
rate of return from lending to the firm must be equal to the opportunity cost R.
12Note that this makes the distinction between output and input goods redundant.
13Even if he could commit to a certain repayment the resulting contract would only be the most 
efficient in the class of linear sharing contracts, but still not necessarily optimal.
14Note that in our context the (second-best) optimal contract will generally not be achieved by 
setting p  =  0. Even though this maximises the lenders’ input, it minimises internal finance (setting 
it to zero in all but the initial period) such that the total means available to the entrepreneur at 
the beginning of a period may be higher with a value p  >  0.
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For convenience we define 7  := and in order to make external finance attractive 
to the firm we assume 7  > /?, where (3 6  (0 , 1) is the entrepreneur’s discount factor.
At any point in tim e the entrepreneur may decide to liquidate his firm, in order to 
work as an employee in another firm for the remainder of his life. The associated 
wage payments have a present discounted value of <7, in term s of consumption utility. 
The two activities are mutually exclusive.
The firm can be viewed as a collection of assets tha t give the entrepreneur access to 
the risky technology. However, he does not receive a revenue from the liquidation 
of those assets as they are worthless without his specific input of hum an capital. 
Moreover, we assume the presence of substantial legal costs which fully erode any 
financial assets left over after liquidation. This ensures th a t the entrepreneur’s utility 
after liquidation is independent of his investment behaviour before.
3.2.3 U pdating of Beliefs
Although x t is not observable to the lenders, they are able to infer its value from 
solving the entrepreneur’s optimisation problem (which is common knowledge). To­
gether with the general observability of yt , this implies th a t the realisation of z t can 
be fully inferred by them.
The information th a t is relevant for updating beliefs is therefore the same for all 
agents. Bayesian updating is a straightforward procedure under our assumptions of 
independently, identically and normally distributed disturbance term s .15 W ith the 
prior distribution of the mean of z t at t being Af (rjt , it can be shown that the 
posterior at t -f 1 (after a realisation of z t) is again normal with mean
ht hc .
^+1 =  l  , l  ^  +  T~Th~Ztl ( )rlt -+• rie t i t  ~r tie
15See, e.g., Berger (1985) for Bayesian updating under the normality assumption.
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and variance
h ^ i  =  h, + he' (3'5)
which declines monotonically to zero over time, such tha t in the limit 77 will become 
fully known.
From (3.1) we see tha t what lenders observe at t , call it £*, is given by
zt = p~1(yt — it In x*) = p~1(p(zt) 7 T  In x t — tt In x^). (3.6)
If the entrepreneur actually behaves optimally and sets x t = £*, all agents always 
have the same information about the firm’s productivity. There is a potential for 
the entrepreneur to m anipulate the signal but this will be taken into account by the 
lenders such th a t in equilibrium z t = zt .
We see from (3.4) and (3.5) tha t the impact of a given realisation of z t on the revision 
of beliefs becomes less and less im portant as tim e goes by, since  ^^  goes to zero. 
Each observation has the same weight, and each new observation is divided by an 
ever-increasing num ber of old observations.
3.2.4 F irst-best Efficiency
We end this section by analysing the investment problem of a social planner who is 
interested in overall welfare. The solution to this is fairly simple as all he needed to 
do is tell the entrepreneur to invest in each period up to the point where marginal 
social return is equal to marginal social cost, which with the simple technology used 
here would imply setting x** = 77r. Note tha t this could be implemented by the 
lenders themselves if they could observe and contract upon the investment level 
chosen by the entrepreneur.
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3.3 The Problem of the Entrepreneur
3.3.1 The Sequence Problem
The problem of the entrepreneur consists of choosing (i) a sequence of investment 
levels, and (ii) to decide when to switch to working as an employee.
More precisely, he has to find a feasible plan for the sequence of investment lev­
els, £i(V _1), t =  0 , 1, 2 ,... which maximises the entrepreneur’s sum of expected 
discounted returns, given a discount rate  j3  £ (0,1) and the history of shocks 
z*-1 =  (z0, ..., z*_i), contained in the set of histories up to t — 1, Z*_1, conditional 
on its value not being too low to justify continuation.
In each period we can define a cutoff point z t representing the minimum value the 
random variable must attain  in order to prevent liquidation. z t is determined by 
the state variables’ values in f, and therefore ultim ately by the history of shocks 
{zt }^“q-1 , conditional on no element zT of this sequence being below the critical 
level z T relevant for that period. Define by Z l :=  {(£o, •••, zt)\zT > z.T, r  =  1,...,<} 
the set of sequences of realisations for which this condition holds, and as \ Z l the 
set of sequences of realisations for which this condition holds only up to the period 
t — 1, but not in period t.
Denote with v* the function which attains the supremum in the corresponding se­
quence problem to maximise the expected discounted sum of per-period utilities, 
i.e.
u*(-) =  sup{xt}c*o ( W(c0) +  i >  [  u(ct)4>t( z t- l ',r)t- l , h t-.l )dz t- 1 
I t=i J z *
+  q ^ 2 [ .  f t i z 1 1]‘Ht- i ,h t - i )dz t . (3.7)
t A  J \ z ' ~ x J
The second term  of the right-hand side is the expected continuation value, and the
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second term  the discounted labour income q weighted by the liquidation probability.
Let the feasibility constraints on x t be described by the correspondence T : S  —> IR, 
where 5  := IR x IR x IR+ is the set of the state variables (a,rj,h). F is nonempty­
valued, its graph is measurable, and it has a measurable selection. Moreover, the 
law of motion associated with (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5) (denoted by m  in what follows) 
is continuous and therefore also (Borel) measurable.
In what follows we assume the return function u to be linear.16 Furthermore, we can 
show tha t the optimal plan is such tha t returns are bounded. To see this, we note 
tha t the marginal cost of investing is constant at unity, whereas, in equilibrium, its 
marginal benefit (in the form of higher internal funds) converges to zero as we let x 
go to infinity. Hence, as p(z) is bounded, the value of internal finance at is always 
finite. Thus, the return function is bounded and it follows th a t v* is bounded as 
well.
3.3.2 The Bellm an Functional Equation
In this subsection we transform the sequence problem into the Bellman functional 
equation
v(a ,r] ,h )=  maxr a +  7(1  — p)[p(rj) +  7r lnz*(a, 77, h)] — x
+/3 j  max[<j, v(a!, 77', h!)\<t>(z\q, h)dz, (3.8)
subject to
a' =  p[p{z) +  7rlna;], (3.9)
h h
= h + h h + h P~l ^ ( z ) +  7rIn ;g ~ 7r ln x 1  ^ (3-10)
h =  h -f- /ze. (3 .11)
16As it is continuous, the return function is clearly (Borel) measurable as  well.
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Given the properties of T, m  and it, boundedness of v* implies th a t the solution to the 
functional equation, v, is equal to v*, and tha t any plan generated by the policy corre­
spondence associated with (3.8) is optimal (see Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989)). 
Since the return function is continuous and bounded it is Riemann-integrable with 
respect to <j>. This and the non-emptiness of T imply th a t v* is well-defined. For any 
feasible sequence given any s0 := (no, V o , h 0 )  € 5 , a solution to (3.8) must
satisfy
u(s0) >  u[s0,a;o] +  {3$(z0\s0)q +  0  J  v[si(x0, z0)\<j)(zo\so)dzo, 
which can be restated as
’(so) >  ix[s0,ar0] + P$(zo\s0)q + 0  f  {u[si(5°), x ^ z 0)]
J z®
+  P$[z\(z°\so)q +  (d f  v[s2{z1) , x 2}<f>{zi\si)dz1 \ 4>(zo\so)dz0.
J
Further rearranging of the right hand side yields
u(s0) >  w[<s0,^o] +  0$(zo\so)q +  P [. (u [si(z°),x i ( z 0)]
J z®
f t ^ l z ^ z 0) ] ^  (j>{zQ\sQ)dzQ +  (32 v[s2{zl )\4)l {z2 \si)dzl .+
It follows by induction tha t
n  »
u(s0) >  w[s0,^ o ]+ /^ ^ (2o|50)q +
t = i
+ 0 t $ [ z t ( z t - 1) \ q ) + P +1 ®[«n+1(? ) ]0 (* ^ 1|.)<i*B,
n = 1 ,2 ,.... As we let n go to infinity boundedness of v is a sufficient condition for 
the last term  to tend to zero in the limit. The equation then becomes
OO p
v(so) >  u is 0 i x o] +  0${zjo\so)q +  Y l  - f t  x t(**)] +  f t $ [ z i ( f t~ l )\(l)
t= 1 J z t
with the right-hand side simply being the expected discounted value of the infinite 
return stream under
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Next take a policy generated by the policy correspondence associated with
(3.8),
G (s0) = {x € r(s0) : u(s0) =  u[s0, x] + (3 f  i>[m(s0, z, z), z]<j>(z\.)dz},
which is nonempty and permits a measurable selection. W ith this policy the above 
holds as an equality, and we note that the right hand side is then, in the limit, 
identical to the definition of the supremum function u*(so). Since so was arbitrary, 
this establishes tha t v = v*.
As explained above, q is the present discounted value of the outside option, to which 
the entrepreneur will switch immediately if the value of v drops below q. Lemma 1 
demonstrates that a solution to (3.8) exists, and that it is unique and bounded.
LEMMA 3.1: There exists a unique, continuous and bounded function v which solves
(3.8). The function is strictly increasing in a and rj.
Proof. Define an operator T  tha t yields v as a fixed point of the equation v =  Tv,  
i.e.
(Tv)(a,  77, h) = max a -f- 6(a, 77, h) +  (3 J max[q,v(a,  q ,h')}<f)(z\r],h)dz.
Note tha t the transition function 4>{z\q, h ) has the Feller property (Stokey and Lucas 
[1989], p .220): As the distributions of 77 and {c* }^  are norm a^ boundedness and 
continuity of a function /  are preserved by the operation f z  f(f>(z\rj,h)dz on this 
function.
Lemma 12.14 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) demonstrates tha t under these conditions 
the operator T  also preserves continuity and boundedness of u, which is a conse­
quence of the continuity and the boundedness of the return  function. Since for two 
bounded functions /  and g , f ( x )  <  g(x),  Vz € X , (T f ) ( x )  < (Tg)(x),  Vz £ X  
(monotonicity), and since [T( f  +  a)](z) <  (T /) (z )  +  (3a, (3 £ (0 , 1) for all bounded 
functions / ,  a >  0, z £ X  (discounting), Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a
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contraction are satisfied, and accordingly the Banach fixed point theorem ensures 
uniqueness.
It follows as a corollary to the Contraction Mapping Theorem (Stokey and Lucas 
[1989], p. 50) tha t if the operator T  maps a nondecreasing, bounded and continuous 
function into the set of strictly increasing, bounded and continuous functions, then 
the fixed point v associated with T  must itself be an element of this set.
That v is increasing in a follows from the fact tha t if we raise a by some amount, 
the entrepreneur can take the same investment decisions, leaving expected future 
rewards unchanged, and consume more in the current period, increasing overall 
utility.
Next note tha t any monotonicity property of a function is weakly preserved by the 
contraction operator T  and tha t v = limn_»oo T nf .  We can pick any function /  
tha t is nondecreasing in 77. Then /  is nondecreasing in z because the transition 
functions for these state variables are, which in turn  implies tha t max[<7, f ( a \  rj\ h')] 
is nondecreasing in z. As an increase in rj shifts distributional weight from points 
with lower functional values to points with (weakly) higher functional values, the 
same applies to /  max[<?, v(a', 77', h')]<f>(z\ri, h)dz. As the return function u is strictly 
increasing in 77, v is is strictly increasing in 77. □
According to (3.8) the entrepreneur uses the risky technology as long as v(a, rj, h) > 
q. The state  of his firm allows him to raise sufficient funds to ensure the risky 
activity is more profitable. Once the value of v(a, 77, h) drops below q he will turn to 
the labour m arket to offer his services as an employee. He will stay there ever after, 
i.e. there is no return to the original business because the state variables will never 
again assume values that would warrant a return to entrepreneurial activities.
Lemma 3.1 implies tha t we can define a function z : S  —> IR tha t assigns to each 
point in the state space a cutoff level for the realisation of 2 , denoted by z(a,rj ,h),  
for which next periods value of u, v(a \  77', h') is ju st equal to  q.
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3.3.3 Growth R ates and Exit Probabilities
The fact that v is increasing in 77 provides the basis for another result, which is 
summarised in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3 .2 :  For a given a level of reputation, rj, the volatility of  the f i r m ’s 
growth rates and its exit probability are decreasing in its age (as measured by h).
Proof. The decrease in volatility over tim e follows directly from the weakening of 
each new observation’s impact on the revision of beliefs about productivity. Fur­
thermore, according to Lemma 1, v is increasing in 77. Thus, conditional on having 
survived so far, next period’s reputation, 77', would have to be lower than some cut­
off level 77' <  77 to provoke exit of the firm. Considering the law of motion of the 
reputation variable in (3.8), the critical realisation of z required to reach this cutoff 
level, given any pre-posterior mean 77, decreases in h. But the probability tha t the 
actual realisation exceeds this critical value (survival) is then increasing in h. □
Proposition 3.2 implies tha t, all other things equal, a young firm is more likely to 
exit than an older firm. Conversely, young firms with good outcomes grow more 
quickly than older firms with the same a priori expected value of productivity and 
the same realisation of the random variable z. More generally, the volatility of 
growth rates decreases in age. This is due to the fact th a t the updating of the 
expected productivity param eter is more responsive to new observations when the 
firm is young and relatively little information has been gathered about it.
These findings per se are by no means new, as they m atch those in Jovanovic (1982). 
However, whereas in the la tter contribution the selection mechanism is first-best 
efficient, this is not the case here. We will dem onstrate in the next section that 
under normal circumstances the entrepreneur’s optimal investment is smaller than 
the first-best efficient level established in Section 3.2. Thus, in the present model 
an entrepreneur may shut down his firm operations even when this is not efficient 
from a social planner’s point of view.
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That firms exit even when continuation would be justified is a consequence of un­
derinvestment, which itself is due to the agency problems stemming from the nonob­
servability of investment. If an entrepreneur whose reputation is just slightly below 
the cutoff level could commit to a higher investment level x  (or if he possessed more 
internal finance a), it would be possible for him to obtain higher total funds. Thus, 
inputs used in production would unambiguously increase and get closer to the so­
cially optimal level without affecting the lenders’ welfare. At the same tim e current 
and expected future consumption could be augmented such tha t our entrepreneur 
would be better off holding on to the business.
The intuition for this is as follows. As the assets become worthless in the case of 
liquidation, the entrepreneur does not expect to reap the entire benefits from his 
investment. W hatever is invested in the firm in a particular period will be lost to the 
entrepreneur if the productivity shock is sufficiently bad to render the outside option 
more attractive than continuation of the project. Benefits from higher investment 
by the entrepreneur are not lost, however, to the economy as a whole in the case of 
liquidation, since creditors or lawyers may obtain them . This observation implies 
tha t, compared to the first-best efficient outcome there will be underinvestment in 
the present model.
The next section focuses on the choice of an optimal policy. In particular, we are 
interested in the effect of reputation (expected productivity) and the level of own 
finance on the entrepreneur’s investment behaviour. Furthermore, we will a ttem pt 
to shed some light on how the optimal policy is affected by the age of the firm.
3.4 The Roles of R eputation and Internal Finance
3.4.1 D ifferentiability of the Value Function
To find the optimal policy by deriving first-order and envelope conditions we need 
to show that the value function v is differentiable. Using arguments from Blume,
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Easley, and O ’Hara (1982), we first state and then prove the following lemma which 
ensures differentiability of the value function of any desired order.
LEMMA 3.3: Given independence of the distribution of  stochastic shocks, i f  the 
return function and the law of motion are differentiable p times, then the value 
function is differentiable p-1 times
Proof. The assumption of independently distributed shocks allows us to transform 
the original functional equation. In particular, we can change variables such that 
next period’s state s' becomes the variable with respect to which we integrate.
First define the function u;(s) :=  u(s) — q and write (3.8) as
u;[s'(s, z)]d$(z),
=.(*)
where z(s) is now defined as the value at which w(s') =  0 .
Due to the invertibility of the law of motion for the state  variable s' = m (s , x , z ' )  
we can define the inverse function for z' by z' =  z/ (s ,a ;,s /) which is also p times 
differentiable. The probability th a t next period’s state variable s' (conditional on 
continued viability) is in a Borel subset of S', say S, given current state s and action 
x , is
f  /~/wr // j~,J- w is m z  ( s ,z ,S ) j----- ^  ds .
Thus, one can rewrite the modified value function as
w(s) = - ( 1  -  /?$[.])q +  u(s,z*) +  (3 J_ w{s)(f)[zI{s, x, s7)] ’ S ^ds .
On the right hand side s does not appear as an argument of w , but only of functions 
which by assumption are differentiable. Obviously, the integrand is then differen­
tiable p — 1 times. □
tu(s) =  - ( 1  -  0$[z\s])q -f u(s, x*) +  p  j
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We rewrite our functional equation (3.8) as
i?(a, 77, h) = maxx a +  7(1 -  p)[p(rj) +  tt ln z ^ a ,  rj, h)} -  x +  P$[z\r), h)]q
r 00
+/? /  v(a\r]' , h')<j>(z\r), h)dz,  (3.12)
J  z(a,r),h)
where the constraints (laws of motion) are the same as in (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11).
3 .4 .2  T h e  E u le r  E q u a tio n
If there were no outside option and no external investors at all, such tha t the en­
trepreneur would have to finance his operations entirely by himself (through negative 
consumption), his optimal per-period investment choice in the case of continuation 
would be x = (3tt, which is obviously less than the first-best optim um  of 7 tt. One of 
the questions addressed here is how the presence of an imperfectly operating credit 
market and an outside option affects the entrepreneur’s choice in relation to the 
first-best.
As the return function is bounded the transversality condition associated with the 
above problem is satisfied. Hence, the first-order condition, combined with the 
envelope condition are necessary and sufficient for an investment plan to be optimal. 
Lemma 3.3 allows us to derive both first-order and envelope conditions.
The first-order condition is
pir dv(a \  rj\ h')
-1  +
+
p L x da' 
ht dp~1\ p ( z ) tt In 2 — 7r In £*]
h + he
~ x  or)'
and the envelope conditions with respect to a' and 7/ are
4>{z\ri,h) = 0, (3.13)
d v { a \r i \ t i )  1 , ^ \ a  f \ ,01^
 —  =  1 +  7(1 -  p ) A a(-) (3.14)
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and
d v ( a \  7/ ,  h ' )
d r f
=  7(1 ~  V>)[pz(Hr} +  (1 -  H)z)  +  A„(.)], (3.15)
respectively.
and
_  x*a(pp(z)lnx,  H tj ~t~ (1 H)z ,  h +  ht ) 
0 x*(pp(z)lnx, Hrj +  (1 — H)z ,  h +  h t)
A ,(-) =
_  x*(pp(z) lnx , Hr] +  (1 — H)z ,  h +  he)
x*(pp(z)lnx , Hr] +  (1 — H ) z , h +  /ie) 
are the percentage changes in next period’s investment in response to an infinitesimal 
increase in the current period’s internal finance and reputation, respectively. We 
have defined H  = and hence 1 — H  =
It follows from the inverse function theorem tha t -P~d^  =  'dp^ )/dz =  DM')]-1 ' Re­
placing (3.14) and (3.15) in (3.13) and using the equilibrium condition x  =  x*, we 
obtain an Euler equation, the solution to which gives is the entrepreneur’s optimal 
investment decision:
r 00
or =  (3 /  7r/i[l +  7 ( l - j u ) A a(-)] (3.16)
J 2 (0 ,77, h)
<f>(z\r]j h)dz.+ Y ^ y \.P‘ (z )\ 17rT( 1 -  n)[Pz(Hri + (1 -  H )z)  + A,(-)]
Unfortunately, one cannot obtain an explicit solution for x* as both A a and are 
functions of next period’s internal-finance level and therefore of x*. In the light of 
the diminishing marginal returns exhibited by entrepreneur’s technology it seems 
plausible to assume tha t both these function are at least nonincreasing in internal 
finance. But then there exists a unique solution to (3.16).
Note that the only place where a appears in this equation is in the the lower bound 
of the integration interval, as the functions A a and A^ do not depend on current 
internal finance. Hence, if there were no outside option such th a t z(a,r],h) goes to 
—00 the equilibrium choice x * would be completely independent of a. Even in the 
presence of an outside option the responsiveness of x* to changes in a is limited if
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the precision h0 of the initial signal for the true productivity value fj is sufficiently 
high relative to /ie, the (constant) precision of the distribution of the disturbance 
term.
We use this observation to prove the next proposition which states the underinvest­
ment result mentioned already in the previous section.
PROPOSITION 3 .4 : For sufficiently small values of ^  the entrepreneur invests less 
than the first-best optimum in each period. This result holds even when there is no 
outside option.
Proof: As we lower | j ,  A a decreases as well because tha t diminishes the im pact of 
investment on the external investors’ updating. For one thing, this has the effect of 
depressing the first term  in the integrand of (3.16) below w.17 Moreover, the second 
term  can be made arbitrarily close to zero such that the overall value of the right- 
hand side is smaller than the first-best optimum 7 7 1 -, even when let z(a, 7 , h) —> —0 0 . 
□
Proposition 3.4 leads us directly to one of the central results of this chapter, namely 
the inefficiently high death rate of firms.
COROLLARY 3 .5 :  Under the assumption of  Proposition 3.4 the liquidation rate of  
firms is inefficiently high.
Proof: If the firm could commit to increase its investment level slightly there would 
be room for Pareto improvement, because at the private optim um  (where we have 
underinvestment according to Proposition 3.4) marginal return on investment his 
higher than at the social optimum. □
REMARK: For high values of jrj- we cannot exclude the possibility that the firm 
overinvests relative to the social optimum, at least for a number of periods in the 
beginning. It is conceivable tha t the incentive to m anipulate the output signal to
17In fact, for this statement to be true regardless of the value of y ,  the value of A a simply must 
not exceed 2.
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the external investors is so strong that an entrepreneur chooses to invest more than 
77T. However, this incentive will wear off eventually as ht grows over time. In the 
case of overinvestment the liquidation rate is obviously to small from a welfare point 
of view.
3.4.3 Com parative Statics
The comparative statics of the investment decision with respect to the exogenous 
param eters are very straightforward. Investment is strictly increasing in the pro­
ductivity param eter 7 r , the discount factor /?, and the inverse of the lender’s cost of 
refinancing, 7 .
The effect of the state variables is less clear-cut, as only the im pact of internal 
finance is unambiguous. Remember th a t due to Lemma 3.1 the function z : X  —>■ IR 
assigns, for a given (7 , /i), a shock cutoff level to each value of internal finance. More 
precisely, z(a,rj ,h)  is decreasing in a because the probability of exit is diminished 
by a higher level of finance. As already mentioned above the integrand on the right- 
hand side of (3.16) does not depend on a, and hence, the entrepreneur’s chosen 
investment increases in the level of own finance he disposes of.
The effect of reputation (expected productivity) on investment is more complex, 
as a change in th a t state variable affects not only the support of the truncated 
distribution of shocks, i.e. 2 , but also the distribution <j> itself, as well as the in­
tegrand in (3.16). The combined impact of the la tter two, which may be called 
‘productivity effects’, is very complex and remains ambiguous even if one could 
make precise statem ents about how the functions A a and A v depend on 7 . If the 
integrand responds positively to increases in 7 and 2 the expected marginal value 
of reputation (in terms of financing capacity) increases in reputation, which means 
that distributional weight is shifted from lower to higher values of the integrand. 
Hence, this partial effect of reputation on investment is positive. If, however, the 
expected marginal value of reputation (in terms of financing capacity) decreases in
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the firm’s reputation, which means th a t distributional weight is shifted from higher 
to lower values of the integrand, the opposite will occur and the productivity effect 
on investment is negative.
W hat we are prim arily interested in this subsection, however, is how the presence of 
an outside option affects investment in response to a change in reputation and how 
this is related to the probability of liquidation. Here the results are more clear-cut. 
It follows from Lemma 3.1 that, given (a, /i), z is decreasing in rj. In other words, an 
improved reputation diminishes the probability of the firm’s exit as a consequence 
of which investment is augmented. Nevertheless, it is not possible to make an 
unambiguous statem ent about the overall effect of reputation on investment.
Comparative statics with regards to the age of the firm, as measured by the state 
variable /i, turns out to be even more difficult. In particular, we cannot tell whether z 
is decreasing in h throughout, as we do not know whether max[g, u] is convex or not. 
If z is decreasing in h then the exit probability is lowered by age. This counteracts 
the negative effect on investment stemming from a reduction in the incentives to 
build a reputation (a reduction in over time). Otherwise the negative incentive 
effect is reinforced by an increased exit probability.
However, equation (3.16) does reveal something about investment behaviour in the 
limit as the firm grows infinitely old .18 Note tha t as h goes to infinity the second 
term  of the integrand goes to zero and z(a,r],h) converges to —oo and A a(-) to the 
zero function. Conditional on surviving tha t long, the true productivity of the firm 
is learnt perfectly, implying tha t there is no shock bad enough to trigger exit of the 
firm. Thus, in the limit we may write
(3.17)
18Strictly speaking, in order to converge to such a limiting behaviour it would be required that 
the firm never experiences a shock that is bad enough to warrant liquidation. This, however, is a 
zero-probability event.
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If the firm were to survive infinitely long, the firm is no longer able to credibly 
commit to an investment above f3ir. The reason is tha t there are no more incentives 
to acquire a reputation and therefore external investors are no longer willing to lend 
funds beyond tha t level.
We summarise the most im portant comparative-statics results in the following propo­
sition.
PROPOSITION 3 .6 :  The equilibrium investment level, x*, is
(i)increasing in internal finance a,
(ii) increasing in reputation if and only if  the lower exit probability is not offset by 
the productivity effect,
(in) increasing in age (precision of the productivity signal) i f  and only i f  a lower exit 
probability is not offset by the reputation-building disincentive caused by age.
Proposition 3.6 and the preceding discussion underline the significance of the out­
side option for investment behaviour. It establishes a positive relationship between 
reputation and, possibly, age on one hand and incentives to invest on the other. 
The lower bound of the set of viable shock realisation diminishes with an increase 
in 77. This represents a lower exit probability for the following period, making it 
more worthwhile to invest in the risky technology. A low current reputation implies 
a high likelihood of becoming an employee in the next period, and the level of cur­
rent investment is irrelevant for the value of tha t new career. This exit-probability 
effect reinforces or counteracts the productivity if the la tte r is positive (substitu­
tion dominates income effect) or negative (income dominates substitution effect), 
respectively.
Similarly, i f  higher age of a firm means lower exit probability, it may, ceteris paribus 
become more lucrative for an older firm to invest than for a younger firm, even 
though reputation-building incentives work in the opposite direction. Again, a lower 
exit probability implies th a t states with a zero marginal return  on investment become
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less likely.
The decline of reputation-building incentives stems from the decrease in the respon­
siveness of the updating rule to good outcomes. Trying to m anipulate the signal 
received by the lenders becomes more and more costly. This effect has been identi­
fied by Holmstrom (1982). In his paper, however, the manager incentives to exert 
effort exhibit an unambiguously monotonic decrease, whereas here it cannot be ruled 
out that this negative effect of age is outweighed by a potentially positive effect of 
higher survival probability which implies a higher expected marginal rate of return 
on investment.
Thus, due to the outside option it may well be the case tha t the investment incentives 
for a young firm are not as high as implied by a model of the Holmstrom (1982) 
type where such an outside option is absent. In other words, it may take time for 
incentives to begin to work. Young firms might not be willing to invest too much 
in the beginning because the probability of early exit and hence of not reaping any 
benefits is very high. They may prefer to keep inputs at a low level in early periods 
in order to obtain more information about their own productivity.
The detrim ental direct effect of this kind of uncertainty on investment is amplified by 
the indirect effect it has on next period’s internal finance and therefore on the level 
of external funds provided, as they are linked to each other. Thus, if in reality we 
observe external investors putting in rather small amounts into a starting business, 
this may be a consequence not only of attem pting to gain more information about the 
quality of the management but also of responding to the firm ’s own low willingness 
to invest.
The possible non-monotonicity of the incentive schedule over tim e can also be ob­
served in Diamond (1989), but for quite different reasons. While Diamond (1989) 
relies on the presence of asymmetric information and changes in the structure of 
credit applicant types, the present model is entirely independent of the industry’s 
cross-section. It is the existence of an outside option th a t is at the core of the
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com parative-statics results here. Per se the desire to build a reputation reduces 
some of the capital market inefficiency created by moral hazard, especially in early 
stages of a firm ’s life. However, this beneficial effect is at least partially destroyed 
when the owner-manager of a firm has alternative ways of making a living.
W henever investment responds negatively to age, as predicted by a model without 
outside option, another interesting result of our analysis is a possible asymmetry 
between upward and downward mobility of growth rates. A bad outcome leads to a 
downgrading of the reputation measure, and at the same tim e the precision h of its 
distribution, increases. The overall effect is then one of reducing the investment rate. 
A good outcome, however, may trigger two opposing effects. Improved reputation 
should cause the investment rate  to increase. But h is still increasing and its impact 
may at least partially offset the first effect. Thus, the reaction to a (moderately) 
good outcome may be ambiguous.
3.4.4 Evolution of Internal Funds
Finally, we consider the evolution of the firm ’s internal funds. The expected value 
of a', given today’s assets a, can be written as
r  oo
E[a] = / \p(z) +  7rlnx*(a, 77, h)]</>(z\rj, h)dz. (3.18)
J zj^a,T],h)
As the set of values tha t a takes on equilibrium paths is bounded, E[a') =  a has 
a fixed point. To examine the dynamics of internal funds two cases need to be 
differentiated. Firstly, if E[a’]/a is decreasing in a, i.e. when the positive effect of 
internal finance on exit-avoidance probability (and therefore on investment) is weak 
or moderate, the system is stable. For low values of a, E[a']/a > 1, such tha t the 
firm’s assets are driven up towards the fixed point, and for high values the converse 
holds. This first case is more likely to occur if the capital m arket imperfections are 
rather weak, as it implies th a t the influence of internal funds on investment is not 
very strong.
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In contrast, the second case occurs when investment is very responsive to changes 
in a, or, more formally, when E[a']/a is increasing in a. This reflects a situation in 
which capital market imperfections are very prominent such tha t a small variation in 
internal finance has substantial impact on investment and exit-avoidance probability. 
Unsuccessful firms have little internal funds, such th a t E[a']/a < 1 . This raises 
expectations of being driven out of business in the near future. Conversely, successful 
firms are expected to grow even more, since for them  E[a']/a exceeds unity. Thus, 
the stronger capital m arket imperfections the more divergent growth rates become.
3.5 M onitored Finance and Adm inistration Procedures
In Section 3.3 it was shown that due to agency problems too many firms are liq­
uidated. As the entrepreneur cannot credibly commit to a higher investment rate 
he cannot a ttract external funds to an extent tha t would allow him to produce 
at a more profitable level. This section considers two mechanisms, monitoring and 
adm inistration procedures in bankruptcy laws, which may improve on this situation.
W ithout explicitly modelling financial intermediation, our framework can also pro­
vide a rationale for lenders’ monitoring of some borrowers. Monitoring can be 
thought of as an activity which either directly allows the entrepreneur to commit to 
a higher investment rate, i.e. increases x *, or is appropriate to raise reputation p by 
some amount S. The former effect increases expected internal finance next period 
and therefore the willingness of external investors to lend money in the future. The 
latter, which can be thought of as stemming from the introduction of additional 
business expertise which raises expected productivity (or effective reputation) to 
rj 5 . 1 9  The two interpretations are qualitatively more or less equivalent in our 
setting.
Assume that our firm can hire one of the lenders as a monitor at a certain cost
19Note that in many companies, especially those operating in financial systems which are strongly 
bank-oriented, financial intermediaries have a substantive influence on business decisions.
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Cm- This may be particularly profitable for a firm exhibiting low incentives to 
invest, which, as the previous section has demonstrated, may be due to reputational 
distress (low 77), young age (low precision h), or both. It may be desirable to incur the 
monitoring cost in order to increase the value of the business via such a commitment 
device. It may be a less profitable action for firms with a sufficiently high 77 or h , as 
for those firms incentive problems are not as im portant. In other words, it is rather 
the young or distressed firms tha t rely more heavily on m onitored funds than others, 
whereas older, well-positioned are more likely to seek direct external finance.20
PROPOSITION 3 .7 :  Given a sufficiently small monitoring cost cm, there exists, for  
each precision h, a critical level of reputation, r\m, such that a firm with 77 < 
wishes to be monitored whereas a firm with 77 >  r)m does not. Hiring a monitor can 
prevent some firms from inefficient liqudation.
The presence of monitoring financial intermediaries such as banks with their mon­
itoring abilities geared towards firms in reputational distress, or venture capitalists 
with their more specific knowledge about new and risky projects may prevent some 
undesirable (inefficient) liquidations.
We now turn  to the second potential mechanism to alleviate the undesirable effects 
of excessive liquidation. Assume tha t the bankruptcy law gives legal authorities 
an instrum ent which allows them  to exert control over the actions taken by the en­
trepreneur at a cost ca >  0. Such a mechanism may be referred to as ‘adm inistration 
procedures’. Usually, this entirely removes control from the entrepreneur, thereby 
more or less credibly creating the prospect of a higher investment level benefitting 
external investors.21 This would increase external funds provided and therefore the 
profitability of the firm.
Instead of simply liquidating the business as before, an entrepreneur in reputational
20Similar results have emerged from a number of other papers (e.g., Diamond (1991)).
21One alternative activity usually associated with ‘administration procedures’ is the restructuring 
of a firm in financial difficulties. Restructuring may have a similar beneficial effect on the willingness 
of outsiders to invest.
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or financial turm oil can concede his control rights to an adm inistrator. This may 
increase his expected discounted utility to an extent which exceeds the adm inistra­
tion cost ca (and potential nonpecuniary costs from tem porarily losing control over 
the firm).
3.6 Concluding Remarks
We have studied the investment behaviour of an intertem porally optimising en­
trepreneur whose assets consist of a reputation (expected productivity) and of in­
ternal finance. It is these values and the age of his firm tha t decide to what extent 
he is able to raise external funds.
We have shown that, due to the nonobservability of his investment choice the bor­
rowing capacity falls short of the socially efficient level. As a consequence of these 
agency costs in the relationship between the entrepreneur and external investors, 
the exit probability is inefficiently high, in particular for young firms.
Moreover, there is not just a negative response of external investors to a low rep­
utation or little internal funds per se, but a firm with such characteristics also has 
poor incentives to invest (or to exert high effort). This effect, which is due to the 
presence of an outside option, is foreseen by external investors, thereby aggravating 
the firm’s situation even more.
Giving such firms the possibility to obtain monitored funds may improve their incen­
tives and reduce the number of socially undesirable liquidations. Thus, one tentative 
policy conclusion of the chapter is tha t there exists a potential for enhancement of 
capital market performance by banks in general, and by specialised providers of ven­
ture capital in particular. Furthermore, the possibility of a firm in severe distress 
to undergo restructuring first rather than going into receivership immediately could 
prevent some undesirable (inefficient) liquidations.
A possible extension of the framework used here includes a stationary version of the
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model, similar to tha t in Holmstrom (1982), where the true value of the reputation 
param eter itself follows a random walk. In such an environment learning has to 
start over and over again, such tha t reputation building remains equally worthwhile 
throughout time. The erosion of incentives to invest would then solely be due to 
the presence of an outside option. A further modification would involve allowing for 
changes of the reputation param eter in any period with a certain (small) probability 
only as, e.g., in Kiyotaki (1990). This may give rise to other interesting dynamic 
patterns of the incentive structure.
Finally, explicitly considering financial intermediaries or other capital m arket insti­
tutions, may be a fruitful way to go.
Chapter 4
Financing Constraints and 
Inventories
4.1 Introduction
A widely reported fact is tha t the variance of production exceeds the variance of 
sales.1 This contradicts the standard linear-quadratic model of inventory investment 
(e.g. Holt, Modigliani, M uth, and Simon (I960)), which predicts tha t in order to 
minimise costs firms will smooth production over tim e using inventories as a buffer 
against demand shocks. For this reason the fact is often referred to as the ‘excess 
variance of production’.
In this chapter we build a model of inventory investment and impose constraints 
on the firm ’s access to external sources of finance. It is found th a t the presence of 
these financing constraints can explain the excess variance of production in a model 
which otherwise would not deliver this result. In addition, the model with financing 
constraints predicts tha t inventory investment and sales covary positively. Moreover,
xThis fact has been found using data of all levels of aggregation. Examples of studies which 
report this finding in U.S. data are Blinder and Maccini (1991), Blanchard (1983), and Blinder 
(1981). For U.K. data see Guariglia and Schiantarelli (1995). For evidence to the contrary see Fair 
(1989) and Krane and Braun (1991).
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even though the stochastic process governing the demand for the firm ’s output is 
specified to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the endogenous 
sales process exhibits positive serial correlation .2
Evidence th a t financial factors influence inventory investment has been documented 
by a number of recent empirical studies. This chapter provides a theoretical link 
between the evidence presented in these studies and the fact th a t production varies 
more than sales. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) find evidence th a t small m anufacturing 
firms draw down their inventory stocks heavily following a m onetary contraction, 
whereas large firms appear to borrow in order to smooth the im pact of a downturn on 
their inventory behaviour. Using U.S. panel data, Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen
(1994) find tha t the inventory investment of small firms is more sensitive to cash flow 
than  the inventory investment of large firms. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) 
include the ratio of bank loans to commercial paper in several structural models of 
inventory investment and find the it has a significant effect. In an examination of the 
1982 U.S. recession, Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) find tha t the ratio of liquid 
to total assets is significant in explaining the inventory investment of firms without 
bond ratings, but is not significant for those firms with bond ratings. Taking different 
structural models to UK panel data, Guariglia (1996) and Guariglia and Schiantarelli
(1995) find tha t financial factors have an im portant effect on the inventory behaviour 
of only those firms which may be in financial distress as indicated by a low coverage 
ratio (the ratio of cash flow to total interest expense). The la tter study presents 
evidence tha t firms with high coverage ratios are more likely to smooth production.
From a macroeconomic perspective, inventories are a crucial component of fluctua­
tions in aggregate output. For example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989) report tha t 
while the stock of inventories makes up only 1% of US GNP, declines in the stock 
account for 50% of the drop in output in recessions.3 Clearly any model of fluc­
2In models where there is the possibility that the firm may stock out in a given period sales 
and demand are generally not identical. Such models are referred to as stockout-avoidance models 
(e.g. Abel (1985), Kahn (1987)).
3Similarly, for the UK Sensier (1996) reports figures of 3% and 30%, respectively.
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tuations in aggregate output must be able to explain the behaviour of firm level 
inventory investment.
One of the shortcomings shared by many theoretical models of aggregate fluctuations 
is the weakness of their propagation mechanisms.4 To strengthen this mechanism 
many recent papers have considered the effects of capital m arket imperfections.5 In 
the light of this development of the theoretical literature, it seems natural to ask the 
following question. Would imposing financing constraints on a partial equilibrium 
model of firm inventory investment explain the excess variance of production? This 
chapter provides an answer to tha t question.
Existing a ttem pts to explain the excess variance of production can be put into three 
classes: (i) the linear-quadratic model modified with the introduction of either non- 
convex costs or cost shocks (e.g. Blinder (1986), Eichenbaum (1989), Ramey (1991), 
Hall (1996), Bresnahan and Ramey (1994)), (ii) the stockout-avoidance model with 
a demand process that exhibits serial autocorrelation (e.g. Kahn (1987)), and (iii) 
models of the (s,S) type (e.g. Blinder (1981), Caplin (1985)). Although much of the 
empirical research has been directed towards the first class of models, satisfactory 
evidence in support of these models is scarce. For example, w ith the exception of 
Ramey (1991), most authors have estim ated marginal costs to be upward sloping 
(e.g. Blanchard (1983), Eichenbaum (1989), West (1986)) suggesting th a t increasing 
returns are not a source of nonconvex costs.6 Similarly, little evidence has been found 
tha t shocks to observable costs have a significant effect on inventory investment (e.g. 
Blinder and Maccini (1991), Miron and Zeldes (1988)).7
4This is particularly true of Real-Business-Cycle models. See Cogley and Nason (1995).
5See, for example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1995), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Gertler (1992), 
Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
6Moreover, Bils and Kahn (1996) show that if marginal costs are decreasing, firm behaviour 
which minimises quadratic costs produces the counterfactual prediction that the ratio of inventories 
to sales is procyclical. More promising models which incorporate non-con vex costs while retaining 
increasing marginal costs have only been tested with data from the automobile industry (e.g. Hall 
(1996), Bresnahan and Ramey (1994)).
7However, Eichenbaum (1989) found no evidence against the version of the linear-quadratic 
model in which unobservable  cost shocks are incorporated.
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In contrast, much less testing has been performed on models in the other two classes.8 
However, the model developed here delivers testable predictions which distinguish 
it from all three categories above. In the second class of model, for instance, sales 
which do not contain information about expected future sales do not affect produc­
tion. This is not true in our model, since such sales change the amount of internal 
funds available to finance production. Similarly, the (s,S) model predicts tha t the 
covariance between inventory investment and sales is zero, whereas the model here 
predicts tha t this covariance should be positive.
The model is presented in the next section of the chapter. To illustrate the intuition 
behind our results, a small example and its solution is described in the third section. 
Then, in section 4.4, we discuss properties of the value and the policy function in 
the general model. Section 4.5 gives sufficient conditions for the production-variance 
result to hold in the general model discusses further predictions of the model, before 
a number of conclusions are drawn and suggestions for future research are given in 
section 4.6.
4.2 The M odel
Consider a firm which produces an (imperfectly) storable good at a constant unit 
cost (which we normalise to 1 without loss of generality). It a ttem pts to sell its 
output each period at price pt . We assume tha t pt =  p > 1 W. The firm enters 
period t > 1 with a stock of goods Gt (those goods not sold in the previous period) 
and a stock of a liquid asset, M t, which for convenience we will call money here. 
The timeline of events in each period is shown in Figure 4.1.
At the beginning of each period the stock of goods depreciates according to a depreci­
ation technology represented by a nondecreasing and convex function S : IR+ —>■ IR+ , 
G 6 (G). We impose £(0) =  0 and 6 (G) < G, i.e. the firm never loses all unsold
8Kahn (1992) tests the stockout-avoidance model, and Mosser (1990) tests the (s,S) model.
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beginning end of
of period period
 1--------------------- 1------------------------ 1--------------------- 1-------------------1 ► time
(Gt, Mt) depreciation decision realisation of (Gt+i->Mt+i)
c>& yt-,St,ct demand shock
Figure 4.1: Timing of events
goods through depreciation. Thus, after depreciation in period t the firm is left with 
Gt -  S(Gt) > 0 goods.9
The firm then makes its gross production decision, yt , its savings decision, s t , and 
its consumption decision, ct subject to the following financing constraints,
Ct > 0 (4.1)
St > 0 (4.2)
yt > 0 (4.3)
Ct +  St -f yt < M t (4.4)
The non-negativity constraint on consumption can be interpreted as preventing the 
firm from raising equity capital from shareholders by issuing negative dividends.10 
The non-negativity constraint on savings is simply a borrowing constraint. The 
non-negativity constraint on gross production implies tha t the firm cannot Teverse- 
engineer’ and thereby consume (or save) out of its beginning-of-period stock of 
goods. The final inequality is the budget constraint.
Once production has taken place the demand realisation, z t+1, occurs. As usual in 
stockout-avoidance models we impose the following non-negativity constraint on the
9An equivalent assumption would be to require the firm to pay a pecuniary storage cost £(G), 
financed by its money holdings. One then has to allow the firm to be able to ‘reverse-engineer’ 
finished goods (generating one unit of money per unit) in order to pay the storage cost in those 
periods when the stock of money is insufficient to cover them.
10Alternatively, it could be interpreted as restricting the firm’s access to trade credit.
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stock of goods (i.e. the firm is not allowed to sell short output):
x t+i = mm[zi+ un t], (4.5)
where n t is the total amount of goods the firm makes available for sale,
n t = Gt -  8 (Gt) +  yt. (4.6)
The demand realisation zt+i is identically and independently distributed in each 
period t on a subset Z  C JR+, according to the probability density function <f>: Z  —>• 
1R. The associated cumulative distribution function is denoted by $  : Z  —> [0,1]. 
For convenience we define z =  inf Z  > 0, and z =  sup Z  (which may be negative 
infinity or infinity, respectively).
The stock of money next period is the sum of this periods savings, st , and the 
revenue generated from sales. Thus, the law of motion for the money stock is11
Mt+i =  St + px t+1, (4-7)
The law of motion for the stock of goods is
Gt+i = Gt — 8 (Gt) -f- yt — xt+i, (4-8)
which can be rewritten as Gt+1 = n t — x t+i.
The objective of the firm is to choose gross production and savings maximise the 
present discounted value of consumption, subject to the above non-negativity con­
straints and laws of motion. More formally, the firm ’s problem can be w ritten as
CO
max /31 Ct (4.9)
t=o
11 For simplicity we have implicitly assumed the gross interest rate on money to be equal to 1. 
The results are not affected by a gross interest rate R  different from unity, as long as j3R <  1.
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subject to (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.7), (4.8), with the discount factor (3 E 
(0 , 1).
Since production is not directly observable in most firm data, it is defined empirically 
to be the change in inventories stocks plus sales.12 Using the law of motion for the 
stock of goods, (4.8), observable production, qti is defined to be
Qt — Gt+1 — Gt +  x t+\ — yt — 3(Gt) (4-10)
Thus, observable production is gross production, yt , net of depreciation. Our pri­
mary interest is to compare the distribution of observable production qt with that 
of sales x t.
4.3 An Example
The main features of the general model can be illustrated with a simple example in 
which all variables are restricted to be integers. In any given period the number of 
goods demanded is either 0 , 1, or 2 , with probabilities 0 o, 0 i, and 02 , respectively, 
such th a t 0o  +  0 i  +  0 2  = 1- The firm can store only one unit of inventory between 
periods. If the firm has unsold inventories in excess of this storage capacity, they 
depreciate completely (i.e. the depreciation function is param etrised as 5(G) =  
max{0, G — 1}).
We first postulate and then, for a set of given param eter values, dem onstrate the 
optimality of the following policy. The firm provides two units of goods for sale 
whenever this is feasible, and one otherwise. If after setting n to 2 there is money 
left over, first one unit is saved, ie. 5 =  1. If there are still remaining funds they are 
spent on consumption.
12See for example the discussion in Blinder and Maccini (1991), p .77.
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(G, M ) X <? n s c u x ' (G", M '
0 (1, 0 )
(1, 0 ) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 (0 , 2 )
1 (0 , 2 )
0 (1, 0 )
(2 , 0 ) 0 -1 1 0 0 0 1 (0 , 2 )
1 (0 , 2 )
0 (2 , 0 )
(2 , 1) 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 (1, 2 )
2 (0,4)
0 (2 , 0 )
(0 , 2 ) 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 (1, 2 )
2 (0,4)
0 (2 , 1)
(1, 2 ) 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 (1,3)
2 (0,5)
0 (2 , 1)
(1,3) 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 (1,3)
2 (0,5)
0 (2 , 1)
(0,4) 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 (1,3)
2 (0,5)
0 (2 , 1)
(0,5) 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 (1,3)
2 (0,5)
Table 4.1: The postulated policy and its implications
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Table 4.1 summarises this information. In a stationary equilibrium the firm can 
assume eight possible states, (G, M ), which are listed in the first column. The 
second column is the (unique) sales realisation, x, tha t has brought the firm into 
tha t state. Columns four to six list the policies we have postulated for each state. 
For each state an action is a triplet (n, s , c ). For example, in state  (1,3) the firm puts 
up two goods for sale, saves one unit of money, and uses one unit for consumption 
(the action is (2 ,1,1)). Column three lists the net production decisions, q, implied 
by these actions. Column seven shows the flow utility  enjoyed by the firm in tha t 
state. Finally, the last two columns show the possible sales realisations, x', and next 
period’s state, (G', M '), associated with each of the three realisations.
Our goal is to solve for the distributions of sales, x, and net production, q. To do so 
on has to derive conditions under which the policy we have postulated is optimal. 
Then we choose a param eter set T =  {p, /?, <£0, <^ i, <^2} for which these conditions are 
satisfied. Finally, given this param eter vector one can solve for the stationary joint 
distribution of the state variables, and compute distributions for x and q from there.
4.3.1 O ptim ality Conditions
To ensure tha t it is optimal to provide n — 2 in the first best case when the financing 
constraint (4.1) is not imposed the chosen vector of param eter values must satisfy 
the following conditions:
2 ^ 2  +  <t>\ — <t>o >  f t  1 ,
4>2 — (<^ 1 +  fto) ft 1 •
The first inequality ensures that it is optimal to provide two units for sale at the 
margin. The second ensures tha t it is never optimal to provide three units.
To analyse the optim ality conditions when the financing constraint is imposed first 
compare u (l,0 )  with u(2,0). In both states flow utility u =  0, and the expected
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discounted value of next period is (3{(f>i +  <?!>2)u(0 ,2). Thus u ( l,0 )  =  u (2 ,0), and we 
call the set {(1,0), (2,0)} an equivalence class of states. For simplicity we refer to 
the value of this equivalence class as V\ . Using the same reasoning we get the four 
equivalence classes
{(0,2), (2,1)}, {(1,2)}, { (1 ,3),(0 ,4)} , {(0,5)}.
We refer to the values of these equivalence classes as u2, v3, v4, and v5, respectively. 
Note tha t v5 — v4 = v4  — V3  = 1. In other words, the value function is linear over 
those states where consumption is positive.
Summing across states there are 40 feasible actions .13 First we compute the differ­
ence in value between the equivalence classes of states. The difference between the 
first two classes is given by
v 2 - v 1 = p[(l  -  <f>o){v3  -  v2) +  <£2], (4.11)
A demand of 1 or 2, which happens with probability (1 — </>o), brings a firm from
equivalence class v2 to class U3, but a firm from only into v2. Moreover, the former
enjoys one unit of consumption if demand is 2 (probability <f>2).
For the difference between the second and the th ird  class we have
v3 ~ v 2 = P[<t>o{ v 2 ~  *>i) +  (! “  *>)]• (4-12)
A demand of 1 or 2, which happens with probability (1 — ^0), yields a firm from
equivalence class ^3 one consumption unit more than a firm from u2. Moreover, with 
zero demand (probability </>2), the former ends up in v2 whereas the la tter is thrown 
back to v\.
13Due to the non-negativity restriction on gross production, y, (1,0,0) is the only feasible action 
for states (1,0) and (2,0).
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Thus, we obtain a system of two linear equations in the two unknowns 
V3 — t>2, the solution to which is given by
_ /?2(1 — 4>o) 2 +  04>2 
V2 V l  1 _  / ? 2 </>0 ( l  -  (f>0 )  ’
and
_ /32<^ q02 +  /?(! — <t>0)
3 1 -  (32(j>o ( l  -  <£0 )
Let us assume param eter values {p ,/?, </>0, <^>i, <£2} =  {2,0.96,0.15,0.25,0.6} 
tu ting them  into (4.13) and (4.14) yields
v 2 — V\ =  1.4072
and
V3  — v2 = 1.0266,
respectively. Stepping into the next higher equivalence class, t?4, simply means an 
additional unit of consumption, and therefore v4  — V3  = 1 <  1.0266 < 1.4072. 
The same is true for the difference between v5 and v4. Thus, the value increments 
are strictly decreasing over the first four equivalence classes and remain constant 
thereafter. This illustrate the strict concavity of the value function in the range of 
assets for which the constraint c > 0 is binding and its linearity beyond tha t region.
For the same reasons as in the unconstrained model, it is never optim al to choose 
n > 2 or n =  0. However, due to the additional constraint it is no longer preferable 
to always set 3 =  0.
That it is still optimal to provide n = 2 whenever possible is shown in the following 
arguments. Consuming the resource unit freed up by providing only n = 1 instead 





1 < /?[(! -  <po){v3 -  V2) +  fa]- (4.15)
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Since 1 < 1.4137, this is clearly the case with our param eter values.
Due to the decreasing increments in value established above the change in expected 
valuation from saving it (rather than investing it in production) is bounded by 
0 [<f>o{v2 — Ui) +  4>i(vz — vs) +  02(^3 — U4)]. The second term  is, of course, zero, and 
stated here only for expositional reasons. If the demand shock is equal to 1 the firm 
will end up in state (1, 2 ) regardless of its decisions about saving and investment.
Since vz — u4 =  — 1, this expression is negative if and only if
02 >  4>o {v 2 -  vi).  (4-16)
For our param eter values this translates to 0.6 > 0.2111. Thus, it is optimal to 
set n * (N ,S )  =  2 V (G ,M )  such that this is feasible. It can be shown that, as a 
consequence, 29 out of the 40 feasible actions can be excluded from the optimal set 
on those grounds.
Next consider states (0,4) and (1,3), where n = 2 is clearly feasible and will therefore 
be chosen. Instead of setting (ra, s ,c) =  (2,1,1) the firm ’s decision could choose 
(n ,s ,c )  =  (2,2,0). This is dominated by the former choice if and only if
/?[0o(^3 — V2 ) + 01 + <^2] < 1,
or
-  v2 ) < 1 -  P(l -  <k). (4.17)
which is equivalent to 0.9638 < 1, given T.
For (2 ,0 ,2) not to be better than (2,1,1),
/3[</>o(^ 2 — ^l) +  (f> l +  02] >  T
or
( 3 ( f ) 0 (u2 -  Ui) >  1 -  ( 3 ( 1  -  <f)0 ). (4.18)
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m ust hold (1.0186 >  1).
Inequality (4.17) also ensures tha t in state (0,5) the choice (2,1,2) is preferred to
(2.2.1); and since it implies tha t
/?[0o(l +  v3 ~  ^2) +  20i +  202] <  2,
(2 .1 .2) will not be dominated by (2,3,0) either. (The additional unit saved has 
expected marginal valuation of (5 < 1 as it is used for consumption with certainty 
next period.)
Inequality (4.18) is required for (2 ,0 ,3) not to be preferred to (2 ,1 ,2). Thus, we 
have disposed of another 5 actions.
In (G, M ) — (1,2), again only choices s.t n =  2 need to be considered. The choice 
of (n ,s , c) =  (2 ,1 ,0) over (n ,s ,c )  =  (2,0,1) requires (4.18) to hold, which we know 
to be true. Thus, the la tter can be eliminated.
That the postulated action (2,0,0) is optimal in the states (0,2) and (2,1) is true 
because all other possibilities involve n < 2 (ie. 6 actions excluded).
In the remaining two states, (2,0) and (1,0), (1 ,0 ,0) is the only feasible action and 
therefore trivially optimal.
In total we have excluded 29 +  5 +  1 =  35 suboptimal actions, leaving us with 5 
optimal ones across all states.
The four independent optim ality conditions are summarised in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 should be read as follows. For example, in states (0,4) and (1,3) the action 
(2,1,1) is preferred to the action (2,2,0) if the condition [1 — /5(1 — 0o)] > /?0 o(^3 — ^2) 
holds (i.e. consuming the marginal unit of money yields greater value than saving 
it). This condition is derived by simply comparing the values of each state under 
the alternative actions.
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(0 ,4),(1,3) 
( 1 , 2) 
(0/ 2),(2, 1) 
(0 , 2 ) , (2 , 1)
(2 , 1, 1) >- (2 , 2 , 0 ) 
(2 ,1 ,0)  >- (1,2 ,0)  
(2 ,0,0)  V (1,1,0)  
(2 ,0 ,0)  >-(1 ,0 ,1)
1 — 0 ( 1 — 4>o) >  0<t>o(v3 ~  V2) 
1 —0 ( 1 — 4>o) < 0<f>o(v2 ~  «l) 
<f>2 > <t>o(v2 ~  Vi)
1 <  0 ( 1  -  4>o) ( v3 -  V2)
Table 4.2: Independent optim ality conditions
4.3 .2  S tationary  d istr ibu tion s
Define f s, s £ S  :=  {(1, 0 ), (2 , 0 ), (2 , 1), (0 , 2), (1, 2), (1,3), (0,4), (0,5)}, E . 6S/ ,  =  1, 
as the probability with which the firm finds itself in state s at any point in tim e.
To obtain stationarity one has to ensure that, given the optim al policy, in each period 
the marginal probability of leaving any state matches the marginal probability of 
coming into it. In other words, the following system of equations has to be satisfied.
<£0/20 =  (1 — <^ o)/iO :
<fio{fo2 +  / 2 I =  / 2 O1
0 o ( / l 2  +  / 1 3  +  / 0 4  +  / 0 5 ) =  / 2 I 7 
(1 — 0 o )(/lO  +  / 2 0 ) =  f o2 ,
< ^ l( /2 1 + /o 2  =  / l2 ,
0 l ( / l 2  +  /0 4  + /0 5  =  (</>0 +  < ^ 2 ) / l3 5
<p2{ f 21 +  / 0 2 ) =  f o4 i
4 > 2 { f l 2  +  / l 3  +  / 0 4 ) =  (1  — <fe) /o5-
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flO /20 /21 fo 2 f l 2 fl3  /()4 /05
0.0039 0.0219 0.1242 0.0219 0.0365 0.2070 0.0877 0.4969
Table 4.3: Stationary distribution
Since these equations are not linearly independent, this system of equations needs 
to be ‘pinned down’ by the adding up constraint
£ / *  =  !•
ses















1 — (fro 










(j>  2(1 — 00 )
<t>l
/ 20-
We assume that the set of param eters T takes on the values {p,/?,<^>0, ^ 1, >^2} =  
{2,0.96,0.15,0.25,0.6}.
The resulting stationary joint distribution for the state  variables are presented in 
Table 4.3, and the implied distributions of (net) production and sales are given in 
Table 4.4.
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y = — 1 y — 0 y — 1 y — 2 a: =  0 x =  l x — 2
0.0219 0.1281 0.2436 0.6064 0.1500 0.2655 0.5845
Table 4.4: Distributions of net production and sales
The mean of production and sales is q = x = 1.4345, and the variances are var(q) = 
0.6334 > 0.5447 =  var(x).  Thus, in this example the firm exhibits production 
counter-smoothing.
4.3 .3  F inancing C onstraints and th e  E xcess V ariance o f P rod u ction
It is the presence of the financing constraints in this model which delivers the excess 
variance of production result. If capital markets were perfect, then the firm’s optimal 
policy for production would be such th a t var(q) =  var(x). Each period the firm 
would simply replace what had be sold and what had depreciated. This implies tha t 
net production, q, is set equal to sales, x, in each period. This implies tha t the 
number of goods put up for sale each period is constant.
When the firm is financially constrained such a policy is not possible. After par­
ticularly low sales realisations depreciation is so high th a t the firm does not have
sufficient funds available to replace what had been sold and what had depreciated. 
In these circumstances net production, g, will be less than  sales, x, and the amount 
of goods put up for sale next period drops below the unconstrained amount. We 
say tha t in this case the firm ‘underproduces’. Now suppose th a t after a low sale 
the firm experiences a relatively high sale. In this case it will have more than  a 
sufficient amount of cash to replace all tha t had been sold and depreciated. It will 
now be in a position to rebuild its inventory back up to its unconstrained level or 
at least close to it. Under these circumstances the firm will ‘overproduce’. W hat 
drives the variance of the firm’s production above tha t of sales is the association of 
underproduction with low sales realisations and overproduction with medium sales 
realisations.
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Table 4.1 reveals th a t there is a discrepancy between x  and q only for states (2,0) 
and (0,2). In (2,0), where the sales realisation (x = 0) is associated with production 
(y =  —1), underproduction of one unit occurs. In this state the firm would like to 
make two units available for sale, but is prevented from doing so by the financing 
constraint. This, in turn, causes the firm to overproduce by one unit in state  (0,2). 
Figure 4.2 helps to illustrate the intuition behind this result. In effect, the financing 
constraints cause a low sales realisation to be mapped into an even lower production 
realisation, and a medium sales realisation to be mapped into a high production 
realisation. If we compare this to the distribution of sales and net production when 
the nonnegativity constraint on consumption is absent, as depicted in Figure 4.3, 
we see this effect clearly.
4.3 .4  T he N atu re  o f F inancing C onstraints
To what extent do the results in this paper depend on the type of financing con­
straints used? Here we offer only informal arguments tha t our results will not alter 
under different assumptions about the financing constraints. The basis for this is 
that regardless of their nature , financing constraints will be binding prim arily after 
low sales realisations. Thus, underproduction will still be associated only with low 
sales realisations, which is the central feature of the excess-variance-of-production 
result.
More specifically, consider two different ways to model the financing constraints. For 
one thing, we may assume that there is a perfectly elastic supply of external finance, 
but tha t it is more costly than internal finance. For the other alternative we may 
think of the firm being able to enter information-constrained insurance contracts.
The first case, where the firm faces a hierarchy of finance, is closer to our model. In 
fact, the financing constraints in our model could be interpreted as representing a 
finance hierarchy in which the premium on external funds is so high th a t it is never 
optimal for the firm to use external finance. Suppose instead tha t the premium
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frequency
f l 2  +  / l 3
sales
f l 2  +  / l 3
f i o  +  /2
production-1 0 21
Figure 4.2: Distributions of sales and net production under financing constraints
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production
- 1 0  1 2  
Figure 4.3: Distribution of sales and net production without the financing constraint
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were low enough to make the use of external finance attractive in some situations. 
In this case the firm can find itself in three qualitatively different regions. In the first 
region, internal funds will be so low tha t the benefit of the marginal good put up 
for sale is high enough to warrant the use of external finance. In the second region 
the firm is still constrained, but the value of the marginal good put up for sale is 
not high enough to justify the use of external funds. Here the firm behaves exactly 
as it would in our model. In the third region the firm is unconstrained. Note tha t, 
because external finance is more costly, the optimal amount of goods put up for sale 
will be lower when the marginal unit is financed externally than  when the marginal 
unit is financed with internal funds. Thus, if the firm begins with the unconstrained 
amount of goods for sale and has a low sales realisation it will underproduce. In 
other words, underproduction will still be associated with low sales realisations.
For the second case, which is somewhat further from our model, our argument is 
only suggestive. Suppose th a t lenders can observe inventories at only two points in 
time: after sales and depreciation, and just before sales. In other words, lenders can 
observe the firm ’s gross production decision, yt. However, lenders cannot observe 
sales and depreciation.14 In this setup there is an incentive for the firm to report a 
bad sales realisation when in fact there had been a good sales realisation. Typically, 
the optimal contract in such a setup would place restrictions on the observable deci­
sion variable in order to ensure tha t the borrower truthfully reports good outcomes. 
This usually implies tha t in bad outcomes the level of the decision variable is lower 
than it would be if all variables were observable, in order to introduce a cost to 
misreporting a good outcome as a bad outcome. We know tha t if all variables are 
observable, then the optim al policy of the firm is to set gross production such tha t 
it equals the sale plus depreciation. In the information-constrained framework, an 
optimal contract would force the firm to set gross production lower than  this for 
low sales realisations. Thus, this informal argument suggests th a t the association
14This argument is consistent with depreciation taking the form of a fixed storage capacity as 
in the example.
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of low sales with underproduction would remain, and th a t the excess-variance-of- 
production result is preserved.
4.4 The General M odel
We can specify either gross production, yt , or, equivalently, the amount of goods 
made available for sale, n*, as a choice variable since n% =  Gt — 6(Gt) + yt- Therefore, 
taking n t and s t as the choice variables, the Bellman equation for the problem 
outlined in section 4.2 is
v(Gt, Mt ) =  max l M t — st — (nt — Gt +  S ( G t ) ) / 3  f  v(Gt+i,  Mt+i) <f>(dzt+i)
n t,St  I Jz_
+  (3 J u(0, Mt+i) 4>(dzt+i)^ (4.19)
subject to (4.1), (4.2), (4.3),(4.7), and (4.8).
4.4.1 The Unconstrained Problem
Consider removing the non-negativity constraint on consumption (4.1) from the 
problem above.15 In this case the following policy would be optimal. Optimal 
savings s*(G, M)  =  0 in each period since (3R < 1. The optim al choice of nt will 
always be an interior solution so th a t we can differentiate the Bellman equation with 
respect to n t . Assuming tha t 5 is differentiable (denoting with S' its first derivative)
15We refer to this problem as the unconstrained problem, and to the non-negativity constraint 
on consumption as the financing constraint. Relaxing the latter allows the firm to perfectly insure 
its desired production expenditure against negative demand shocks through negative consumption 
in those periods where it does not have sufficient cash on hand. It is precisely the availability of 
this insurance we wish to remove with the constraint on consumption. If, instead, we had relaxed 
the non-negativity constraint on savings (4.2), the firm’s optimal policy would have been simply 
to borrow as much as possible in the first period, due to the linear utility function and f3R <  1.
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and using the envelope conditions, VMt = 1 and vot =  (1 — £'((7*)), we obtain
r n t  roo
/  $'{Gt+i)) <t>{dzt+i) / p4>(dzt+i) = 0  1 (4.20)
J  z  J n t
as the Euler equation. Since equation (4.20) involves neither M t nor Gt the optimal 
policy for the firm is to set n*(G, M) = N,  a constant. This implies tha t in each 
period net production, qt , is set equal to sales, x t. Therefore, if this financing 
constraint is relaxed var(q) = var(x).
4.4.2 The Constrained Problem
When the non-negativity constraint on consumption is imposed we can no longer 
guarantee the differentiability of the value function since there is no way to guarantee 
that the optimal policies will be interior solutions. Thus we cannot simply analyse a 
version of equation (4.20). However, the following properties of the solution can be 
established, and they are sufficient to prove th a t the variance of production exceeds 
the variance of sales when all of the financing constraints are imposed.
Property 1. The Bellman operator defined in (4-19) is a contraction mapping with 
a unique fixed point.
Due to the non-negativity constraints (4.2) and (4.3), the state  space for this problem 
is bounded below by zero. We assume arbitrary upper bounds to the state space, 
M  and G .16 W ith this assumption it is straightforward to show tha t the conditions 
for Lemma 9.5 and Theorem 9.6 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) (pp.261-64) 
are satisfied. Thus, the Bellman operator defined on the right-hand side of (4.19) is 
a contraction mapping with a unique fixed point.
Property 2. v is increasing in M  and G.
Because of the law of motion for money (4.7), the one-period return  to the firm,
16Below we show that solution to the problem is characterised by upper bounds on n  and s,  
which implies that M  and G  are bounded, too.
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M  — s — (n — G 8(G)), and the feasibility constraints are all increasing in the 
state  variable, M , v is also increasing in M  by theorem 9.7 in Stokey, Lucas, and 
Prescott (1989) (p.264). Similarly, since the law of motion for goods (4.8), and the 
firm ’s one-period return  are also increasing in G, v is increasing in G as well.
Property 3. v is concave and strictly concave in the region of  constrained states.
Proof: That v is concave is standard and stems from the fact th a t the Bellman 
functional equation v = T v  is a, contraction mapping, with an operator T  tha t 
preserves concavity. This is because integration in (4.19) preserves concavity and 
the return  function is concave as well (see Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) [p.265] 
for details).
To show strict concavity in the constrained region we adopt the m ethod of a con­
cavity proof in Abel (1985).17
Consider two firms, A and B in constrained states ( G a , Mjf) and ( G b , M b ) ,  respec­
tively, such that G b  — & ( G b ) + M b  > G a  — 8 ( G a ) +  M a , with optim al policy choices 
{ua ,sa)  and (725, 5 5 ), respectively. Assume that ub  > tia- A convex combination 
of the two firms is in state ( O Ga  + (1 — 0 ) G b ->0Ma  +  (1 — 6 ) M b ), and a policy choice 
(On a +  (1 — 0)ns-> Os a +  (1 — 0 ) s b ) is feasible due to the convexity of 8.
If this period’s demand shock z  is greater than both u a  and 715, both firms stock 
out which leads to next period’s states (G ^ M ^ )  =  (0 , 5,4 + pua)  and (G'B,M'B) = 
(0,5b -\-pns), respectively. The same is true, however, for the convex combination, 
whose new state would then be (G'g, Mg) =  (0 ,^ (5^+ p7i^)4-(l — ^)(55+p7i^)). As v 
is concave the value of the convex-combination firm next (and hence in the current) 
period, denoted by vg, is therefore not smaller than the convex combination of the 
two firms, given by O v a  +  (1 — 0 ) v b -  Note tha t the production-savings choice made 
by the convex-combination firm is not necessarily optimal.
17In that paper production occurs with a lag. Consequently, only the stock of inventories which 
the firm has at the beginning of the period are available for sale. Moreover, the stock of inventories 
is the only state variable.
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Similarly, if the demand shock z lies below both ua  and n# , none of the firms, 
including the convex combination, will stock out. Next period’s states are then 
(G'a.M'a) = (nA — z , s A +  pz) and (GB, M B) = (ub -  z , s B +  pz) for firms A and 
B, respectively, and (G'&,M'e) = (0nA +  (1 — 9)nB — z ,9 sA +  (1 — 9 ) s b  +  pz) for 
the convex-combination firm. Its state is just the convex combination of (G^, M'A) 
and (Ga ,M'a ). for the convex combination. Because of the concavity of v, vq > 
9va +  (1 — 0)vb in this case as well.
If the demand shock 2 lies between nA and n^, firm A stocks out but firm B does 
not. Their states next period are then (GA, M A) =  (0,6,4 + pnA) and (G'B , M 'B) =  
(ns  -  z, SB+pz), respectively. If 2 <  0nA +  (1 — 9)u b , (GJ, M'e) =  ($nA +  (1 -  9)ub -  
z ,9 sA + ( l - 9 ) s B +pz),  and if 2 >  9nA +  (1 - 9)nB, (G'd, M 'd) =  (0,9(sA + p n A) + ( l -  
&)(SB + P ^ a ))- In either case we can imagine tha t, in a first stage, shares 9 and 1 — 0 
of demand 2 are covered by divisions a and 6, respectively, of the convex-combination 
firm, where division a corresponds a proportion 9 and division b a proportion 1 — 9 
of the firm. Its value would then just be the same as the convex combination of the 
values of firm A and B. However, in a second stage, excess dem and from division a 
can be shifted to division b and (partially) satisfied there. This leads not only to 
higher overall revenues but also to a reduction in goods depreciation. Hence, with 
this demand constellation, v$ > 9vA +  (1 — 0)vB. In expected term s, the valuation of 
the convex-combination firm is therefore strictly higher than the convex combination 
of the values of A and B. □
In the example of section (4.3) we were able to  compute a stationary distribution of 
states. Showing th a t an ergodic distribution exists in our general setting is a rather 
formidable task. We therefore simply assume existence of stationarity  in the general 
model.
The following propositions and corollaries characterise optim al policy functions and 
are used to derive a number of statem ents about the distribution of sales and net 
production in the next section.
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PROPOSITION 4 .1 :  There exist upper bounds to the optimal policies, n and s, referred 
to as n, s. I f  M  — s > n — G +  d(G) the remaining money is used for consumption.
Proof. Suppose the firm never consumes. Since v(G , M )  is then strictly concave 
in both its arguments , the marginal returns to savings and to production will 
be decreasing in both state variables. The value of an infinitesimal unit of money 
would tend to (3 as M  —> oo, since the probability of encountering a sequence of sales 
realisations in which the non-negativity constraint on consumption will be binding 
tends to zero (effectively, the firm becomes unconstrained). Since (3 < 1, there will 
be a level of savings, s, beyond which the firm will prefer consumption to  further 
savings. Similarly, as G —> oo the marginal value of inventories tends to a value 
below one, since the probability of selling the marginal unit goes to zero. Thus, 
there also exists a level of goods the firm puts up for sale, h , beyond which the firm 
prefers consumption to further production.18 □
COROLLARY 4 .2 :  There exist optimal policy functions, s*(G,M) and n*(G,M),  
which map each element of the state space into the space of feasible actions.
The one-period return function is concave in the state variables, and the feasibility 
set for the choice variables is convex. Over the region where consumption is zero v is 
strictly concave. It follows tha t, in this region, the maximum in (4.19) is attained by 
unique choices of st and n t. From Proposition 4.1. it follows tha t when consumption 
is positive, s* = s and n* = n. □
COROLLARY 4 .3 :  The mean of production, q, equals the mean of sales, x.
Proof. Suppose q > x. Then the firm would accumulate inventories indefinitely, 
contradicting the existence of fi. Conversely, if q < x were true, then G —>• 0 as 
t —> oo, which cannot be optimal since v(G, M)  is increasing in G. □
Intuitively speaking, this corollary holds because each unit of output th a t the firm 
produces is either sold, or depreciates which is accounted for as negative production.
18The existence of s  and h  implies the existence of endogenous upper bounds to the state space, 
M  and G
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PROPOSITION 4.4 :  The optimal policy functions n*(G ,M) and s*(G, M )  are non­
decreasing in total funds available to the firm.
Proof: We will first present the proof for n*(G,M).  The statem ent clearly holds 
for states in which the non-negativity constraint on consumption does not bind, 
as for those states additional money holdings are simply used for consumption, 
without changing the amount ft made available for sale. For states in which the 
non-negativity constraint on consumption is binding we prove the statem ent by 
contradiction. Note tha t in those states the return function is equal to zero, and we 
can therefore write
r n * ( G , M )
v(G, M) = p  I v(n*(G, M)  -  z, s*(G, M )  +  pz)<f>{z)dz
+/?[1 -  $(n*(G , M))]v(0, s*(G, M )  +  p n { G ,  M)).  (4.21)
Assume tha t in some (G, M ) the optimal policy prescribes to choose values (n ,s). 
Also suppose tha t, given some small e > 0, the optim al action in (G, M  +  e) is 
(n — i j , s  +  e +  /x), for some small / i  >  0, which implies
/
n-M
v(n — fi — z , s  + e-1- fi + pz)<f>(z)dz +  [1 — <&(n — /i)]u(0,5 +  e — (p — l)/i +  pn) >
rn
j  v(n — z, s +  e +  pz)4>(z)dz +  [1 — $(n)]u(0, s +  c +  pn).  (4.22)
But then the firm could do better by shifting funds yt from production to savings in 
(G, M)  as well, i.e.
/n-n v(n  — yt — z , s  +  fi +  pz)<f{z)dz +  [1 — $ (n  — fi)]v( 0, s +  (p — 1 )yi +  pn) >
r n
J  v(n — 2 ,5 +  pz)<j>(z)dz +  [1 — $ (n )]u (0 ,5 -1- pn). (4.23)
Hence, (n ,s )  cannot be an optimal choice in state (G, M ), which contradicts the 
initial assumption.
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To show th a t the previous inequality holds, note first th a t for very small /i, the 
decrease of the first term  of the left-hand side due to the change p in the (upper) 
integral boundary is offset by the increase of the second term  of the left-hand side 
due to the same change p in the (lower) integral boundary.
Since v is strictly concave where the non-negativity constraint on consumption is 
binding, the stock-out terms (without probabilities) of the two inequalities compare 
as follows:
u(0 ,s +  e + (p —l ) f i+ p n )—u(0 ,s +  e+pn) <  u(0, s + (p — l)p-\-pn) —u (0 ,s+ p n ). (4.24)
Moreover, conditional on not stocking out, reducing n in favour of s is at least as 
valuable at lower savings as it is at higher savings (because of depreciation). Hence, 
V z <  n — p,
v ( n —p — z : s-\-cJt-p-\-pz) — v(n — z , s  + c-{-pz) < v ( n - p  — z ,s - \ -p+pz)—v(n — z ,s+ pz) .
(4.25)
This is true because, by approximating both sides of the inequality arbitrarily closely, 
we can rewrite it as
— [u(n—z, s-fe+pz) —v (n —p —z, s+e-\-pz)\p-\-[v(n—z, s-\-e+pJrpz)—v (n —z, s+e+pz)]p
<  — [v(n — z , s  +pz)  — v(n — p  — z, s +  pz)\n +  [v(n — z , s  - h p  +  pz) — v(n — z , s  + p z ) ] / x ,
(4.26)
or
[v(n — z, s +  e +  p + p z ) — v(n — z , s  +  e + pz)\ — [v(n — z, s +  p +pz)  — v(n  — s-\-pz)]
< [u(n — 2 , s +  e+pz) — v(n — p — z ,s + c + pz)] — [v(n — z , s +  pz) — v(n — p — z , s T pz)].
(4.27)
Due to strict concavity of v, both sides of the inequality measure the extent to
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which the value gain, due to the funds being larger by e, is reduced by an increase 
in savings and production, respectively. More precisely, the left-hand side of the 
inequality represents the decrease in the value gain (implied by an e-increase ) that 
stems from adding even more funds, /i, to savings. The right-hand side is equal 
to the decrease in the value gain (implied by an e-increase) due to an increase (i 
of the target inventory. The former decrease is larger in absolute term s since the 
gross unit return on additional savings (j, is 1 V 2 , whereas the gross unit return 
on an additional goods provision of p is strictly smaller than  1 for at least some z 
tha t do not lead to a stockout. An analogous argument can be made when there 
is a jum p from state  (G, M )  to a state (G +  e, M ), as this would be equivalent to 
leaving G unchanged and increasing M  by some fraction of e (which depends on the 
depreciation technology).
As for the function s*(G, M)  assume tha t there is a range of states over which the 
function is decreasing. The only way s* could be decreasing in the constrained region 
is if there was an overproportionate increase of n in response to a small increase of 
funds available (be it in the form of more money or of higher goods inventories). 
Due to strict concavity of the value function, however, the negative effect on the 
expected value of v next period due to a decrease in s would more than offset the 
positive effect of an increase in n. We conclude tha t such a policy cannot be optimal. 
□
COROLLARY 4 .5 :  Each state (G ,M )  has a unique sales realisation which moves the 
firm from other states into this state. In other words, there exists a function, call it 
x*(G ,M) : (G , M )  (-)• x which maps each element of the state space into the set of 
feasible sales realisations.
Proof: Suppose th a t the sale x' moves the firm to the state  (G , M )  from the post- 
production pair in ' , s'), and that a different sale x"  moves the firm to the same state 
(G ,M )  from a different post-production pair (n",s").  Then
G / / // // . / / / / / /— n — x = n — x  => x — x = n — n
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M  =  s' +  px' = s" +  px" => x" — x — ---------
P
However, from Proposition 4.2 we know that if n" > n' then s" >  s'. Thus the above 
equations cannot be satisfied simultaneously when x' ^  x " . □
The next proposition turns out to be very useful in obtain in the main results of the 
chapter (section 4.5). The first part states th a t, in the range of sales tha t do not 
lead to stock-out, an increase in sales x (x < k  where k is the level of the previous- 
period target inventory) does not lead to a reduction in the firm ’s overproduction, 
defined as 7r(x,  k) := q(x, k) — x. Put differently, net production q grows by at least 
as much, in the response to the increase in £, as a: itself.
The second part implies th a t as the firm gets wealthier (in term s of post-depreciation 
goods and money held at the beginning of a period) the share of additional wealth 
used for production financing does not increase.
PROPOSITION 4.6: Conditional on not stocking out, i.e. for all values n > x, it is 
nondecreasing in x. Moreover, n is concave in x.
Proof: The first part of the statem ent is a consequence of Proposition 4.2. Increase 
the sales of a firm by one unit. The firm will then produce at least one unit more 
to replace this extra unit sold, because even after having done so it has goods 
inventories at least as high, and money holdings tha t are higher (by p — 1) than 
without the sales increase. Therefore q — x is at least as high as before. For the 
second part of the proposition note tha t for both assets (goods and money) to be 
held in positive quantities optimality requires tha t the marginal valuation of both 
assets be equalised at each level of wealth (goods after depreciation plus money 
holdings, both before production).
As the probability of not stocking out increases in n, investing additional wealth 
in goods inventories becomes relatively less attractive, whereas retaining additional 
wealth as cash becomes relatively more attractive. W hilst the marginal valuations 
on both assets are decreasing in wealth (which is due to to the strict concavity of
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v in both state variables), tha t of goods diminishes at a higher rate than  tha t of 
money. □
4.5 Main Results
In this section we will present not only the main result th a t production is more 
volatile than sales but also a number of other findings. In particular, it will be 
shown tha t the sales process exhibits first-order autocorrelation although the de­
m and shocks are i.i.d.
First, we have to make a statem ent about the expected overproduction as a function 
of the sales realisation, which will then serve as a sufficient condition for the main 
proposition.
Let Qk = { (n _ i,s_ i) | n_i =  /c}, and g(k) =  Jq / (n ~ i ,s _ i)d s _ i , where /  is the 
joint probability density function of n and s, and recall tha t 7r(x,k) =  q(x ,k )  — x. 
(The subscript -1 indicates tha t the previous-period value of a variable is referred 
to.) Also denote with K x the union of all Qk such tha t k > x. Moreover, define as 
p the inverse of the demand distribution’s hazard rate  j z q .
We can then write the expected difference between production and sales, conditional 
on selling x,  as
h(x) = <f>(x) / g ( k ) w ( x , k ) d k [1 — ^(x )]g(x ) ‘K(x^x,).
 ^Aj
For the proof it is useful to divide this expression by ^ r^y , which yields
TTf \ l Ks9{k)n{x , k )dk , , w N
H (x > = „(«. ^ ---------- +  p ( z ) g ( x b7T{X, X)
It is clear tha t H(x)  always carries the same sign as h(x).  We make the following 
assumptions about the demand distribution <f>.
Assumption A .l: In the range where x is such tha t H(x)  < 0  the demand probability
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density function 4> exhibits a monotone hazard rate, i.e. p is nonincreasing, and it 
generates a stationary distribution g such tha t >  0.
Assumption A.2: In the range where x is such tha t H (x)  < 0 ,  —-y >
LEMMA 4.7: Under Assumptions A . l  and A . 2  there is a unique value of  x in the 
interior of  [2 , h\ such that h(x)  =  0.
Proof  To begin with we note the following three observations: Firstly, note that 
h(z) < 0 since at the lower bound of the sales interval net production is always 
lower than sales. Otherwise the firm would have to lower cash balances to return 
to or exceed the target inventory before the sale realisation; however, we know 
from Proposition 4.2 tha t this is suboptimal. Secondly, h(n)  =  0 because stocking 
out at the maximum target-inventory level implies an increase in money holdings. 
Therefore, the firm after production will simply have returned to h. Thirdly, we can 
find an e > 0 small enough such that, for a sale x = h — e, h(h — e) >  0; otherwise 
n would never be reached.
It follows tha t there is at least one value of x , such th a t (i) h{x) =  H(x)  =  0, and 
(ii) both h and H  are increasing at th a t point. Denote the highest such value of x 
by xo- We will now show that x q  is the only point satisfying these two conditions 
by arguing tha t H  is concave for values of x below xo, which means tha t once H  is 
negative it never assumes positive values as we lower x.
To keep notation simple we assume th a t h (and H)  are twice differentiable.19 By 
differentiating H(x)  twice and rearranging terms we obtain
, lKx 7r,\ x yk )9 (k)dk tt" ( x , x ) f Kxn (x ,k )g (k )dk
g 1 / \ / \<27T(x, XJ 7T\X,Xy
27t'(x, x ) fK 7r'(x, k)g(k)dk 2ir'(x, x )2 f K 7r(x, k)g(k)dk
7r(x ,x )2 7r(x,x)3
+p"{x)g{x) +  2 p‘(x)g'(x) + p(x)g"(x).
H"(x) = -
19Arguments analogous to those here could be made by using discrete increments for the variables 
as in the proof of Proposition 4.4
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Under A .l the first term  is non-positive. Next note tha t for all x < x 0
Tr(x , k )g(k )dk  <  — p ( x ) g ( x ) n ( x ,  x) <  0 ,
which, together with Proposition 4.4 means tha t the second and the th ird  term  are 
non-positive.
At xo H  has positive slope, which implies
Sk io 7r' ( a;0. k ) g ( k ) d k  ^  [1 -  p ' ( a 0 ) ] g ( g 0 ) p ( x 0)g ' ( x0) x 0) f Kxo w( x 0, k ) g ( k ) d k
t t ( x 0, x 0)2 - k ( x o , X q )  7r(a;o, S o )  7 r ( s 0 , x 0 )3
It follows tha t under A .l
summarised in Proposition 5.2.
PROPOSITION 4.8: The variance of production exceeds the variance of  sales. The
- 2
7( x 0 , ;r0) f K^  7r'(x0, k ) g ( k ) d k  7r'{x0, x 0)2 JKxq 7 r ( x 0 , k ) g ( k ) d k
< 0.
Finally, due to assumptions A .l and A.2, the last three term s are non-positive either, 
such that H"(x) < 0 for all x < xq. □
We are now in a position to state and prove two central results of the chapter, as
covariance of production and sales also exceeds the variance of sales.
Proof: We know from the proof of Lemma 4.7 tha t h(z) < 0  and h(h) =  0. Lemma
5.1 itself tells us therefore tha t there is a value of x,  call it x  such th a t h(x) > 0 V 
x £ {x,h)  and h(x) < 0 V x € (z ,x ) .  As a consequence,
(4.28)
This is true because from Corollary 4.3 we know that the means of production and
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sales are equal, implying
J  h(x)dx = 0 . (4.29)
In conjunction with Lemma 5.1. this implies that in (4.28) the high sales outcomes 
are weighted with the same absolute amount of positive mass as the low sales out­
come are with negative mass, from which observation the inequality follows.
We can express the variance of net production, var(q), as
r n
var(q) = / (h(x) +  x — p)2dx
/n r n  r n  r n(x2 +  p 2 — 2fix)dx +  J  h (x )2 dx — 2/j, j  h (x )d x  + 2 J  h ( x ) x d x
r n  r n
(x) +  J  h (x)2 dx + 2 j  h ( x ) x d x= var\
Thus, (4.28) is a sufficient condition for var(q) > var(x).
We can write out a similar expression for the covariance of sales and net production,
cov(x , q).
/n (h(x) -f x)(x  — fi2)dx
r n  r n  r n  r n
=  / h(x)x  — ft h(x)dx  +  / x 2dx — fi /  xdx
r n
=  / h(x)xdx  -f var(x)
Condition (4.28) is both necessary and sufficient for cov(x,q) > var(x)  to hold. □
This result has straightforward implications for the covariance of sales and changes. 
The finding th a t it is positive is once again conforms to empirical observations.
COROLLARY 4.9: Changes in the stock of  inventory put up for sale, A n t) covary 
positively with sales, x t .
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Proof. W riting out the expression for cov{An, x)  we obtain
cov(An, x )  = cov(n,  x) — cou(rc_i, x)
=  cov(q- \ -G,x)  — covin -  i , x )
=  cov(q , :r) -f cou(n_i — x , x )  — cov ( n- 1, x)
=  cov(q , a:) — va r ( x ) ,
which is positive from Proposition 4.8. □
Another im portant result of the present contribution is th a t the model generates 
positive serial correlation in sales despite the fact tha t the underlying demand pro­
cess i.i.d.
PROPOSITION 4 .1 0 :  Sales exhibit positive first-order autocorrelation.
Proof. W ith each pair of current and next-period sales realisations (x , x ') we can 
associate a set K x>{x), which is the union of sets of pairs (n, 5) such th a t n > x' (see 
also the definition at the beginning of this section). We can then write the expected 
difference of next period’s sale from the unconditional mean, conditional on this 
period’s sale x as
m{x)  =  4>{x) f  g{k)(x'  — x)dk  +  [1 — §{x' ) \g{x) {x'  — £). (4.30)
J K x,{x)
The covariance of sales with its first lag is then
r n
cov ( x \ x )  =  / m(x) (x  — x)dx
=  J [m{x)x — m{x)x]dx
n
m ( x ) x d x , (4-31)
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where the third line follows from the fact tha t
J m(x)dx  = 0, (4.32)
which is equivalent to saying tha t by integrating the conditional mean of next pe­
riod’s sales over all possible sales realisations this period we obtain the unconditional 
m ean of sales x.
From Proposition 4.4 it follows tha t an increase in the sales realisation leads to a 
target inventory which is at least as high as that without the increase. Therefore, 
the conditional mean m(x)  is nondecreasing in x. Moreover, since the firm does not 
always put up n for sale, it must be true tha t m(n)  > 0. This implies tha t there 
is a sale, w £ [z,fi] such tha t for all x > w the conditional expectation of next 
period’s differential between sales and the unconditional mean of sales is positive, 
i.e. m ( n ) > 0. Similarly to the proof of Proposition 4.8, positive weight is attached 
to higher values of x and the same negative weight (in absolute terms) to lower 
values of x. Hence, (4.31) must be positive. □
4.6 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
This chapter has presented a model of inventory investment in which the firm ’s 
access to external sources of finance is constrained by a borrowing constraint and, 
in particular a nonnegativity constraint on consumption. This model can explain 
the excess variance of production, and yields the prediction of positive co-variation 
between inventory investment and sales. Equally im portant, the endogenous sales 
process exhibits positive serial correlation even though the underlying (and unob­
servable) demand process is exogenously specified to be serially uncorrelated.
It was also shown th a t as a constrained firm ’s internal wealth increases, it puts more 
resources in the production of goods, but at the same tim e also increase its savings 
(cash holdings). Thus, the two forms of investment can be regarded as complements
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rather than substitutes. The more a firm offers for sale, the higher the probability 
tha t it is left with a certain unsold amount of goods. As after a bad sales realisation 
the the low revenue and the ensuing depreciation erode the firm ’s asset position, it 
may not be able to produce the desired amount of goods in the following period, 
unless its money holdings are sufficiently high.
One possible extension of the model would involve the relaxation of the constant- 
price assumption. If the firm has some form of monopoly power it may want to use 
the price as an additional instrum ent to respond to unforeseen shocks by influencing 
expected future demand in certain ways. It would be particularly interesting to 
examine how a monopolist reacts to a very bad sales shock tha t leaves him both 
with very few goods after depreciation and with little money. On one hand the firm 
then has very few goods to offer which, ceteris paribus, makes the probability of 
stocking out very high, which may induce the firm to set a rather high price. On the 
other hand, however, the constrained firm may be desperate enough for cash tha t it 
will not want to risk a low sales realisation due to a price tha t is too high.
Another promising avenue for future research is to study a competitive-equilibrium 
framework with the features presented here. Even though firms would then be price- 
takers as they are in this chapter, the price would be endogenously determined in 
equilibrium. The presence of financing constraints may lead to interesting price 
processes and aggregate output fluctuations.
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